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1. Curriculum Vitae
1.1. Personal Information
• Name: 	 Giorgio DI NATALE
• Date and Place of Birth: 	 10 February 1975, Torino (Turin, Italy)
• Nationality: 	 Italian
• Personal address:	 5, rue du Lauzas, 34380 Mas De Londres, France
• Current position:  “Chargé de Recherche 1ère classe”, CNRS
• Work address:	 LIRMM, UMR 5506, 161 rue Ada, 34392 Montpellier Cedex 5, France 
• Work phone:	 04. 67. 41. 85. 01
• Fax:	 04. 67. 41. 85. 00
• Email:	 giorgio.dinatale@lirmm.fr
1.2. Cursus
• 1994: High School degree (Computer Science Technical Institute, score 59/60), Turin, Italy
• 1999: Master degree in Computer Engineering (score summa cum laude), Politecnico di Torino, Italy
• 1999: National Engineering habilitation exam, Turin, Italy
• 2003: Ph.D. degree in Computer Engineering, Title:  “Software-Implemented System Dependability for Safety Critical 
Applications”, (score Excellent), Politecnico di Torino, Italy
• 2003-2006: Post-doc position, Topic: “Reliability and Test of Digital Systems”, Politecnico di Torino, Italy
• 2006-2007: Post-doc position, Topic: “Design and Test of Secure Circuits”, LIRMM - Montpellier, France
• 2007: Qualification MCF, Section 61, n° 07261174644 
• From 2007: Chargé de Recherche 1ère classe, CNRS
1.3. Research Interests
• Memory Testing
• Digital Testing and Design for Testability
• Fault Tolerance and Reliability
• Computer-Aided Design Tools
• Design, Test and Reliability of Secure Devices
• Hardware Security and Trust
• Test of TSV-based 3D Stacked Integrated Circuits
• Dependability of microprocessor-based systems
Chapter I: Summary
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1.4. Summary of the hot points
• Co-author of 2 book chapters, 18  international journal papers and more than 90 papers and presentations in international 
conferences, 1 patent
• Co-supervisor of 12 PhD students, 2 Post-Doc students and more than 30 master students.
• Action Chair of the COST Action IC1204 (TRUDEVICE) on Trustworthy Manufacturing and Utilization of Secure Devices
• Scientific leader (for the CNRS) of the FP7 European Project CLERECO (Cross-Layer Early Reliability Evaluation for the 
Computing cOntinuum)
• Participation to overall 13 european- and national-funded projects (since 2000)
• Associate Editor of the journal “Information Security Journal: A Global Perspective”
• Guest Editor of the journal “IEEE Design & Test”
• Guest Editor of the journal “IEEE JETTA: Journal of Electronic Testing - Theory and Applications”
• Chair of IEEE Computer Society European TTTC
• Database and Web chair of the TTTC and several test-related conferences
• Vice Chair of the Technical Activity “Hardware Security and Trust” of the IEEE Computer Society TTTC 
• Co-Chair of the Technical Activity on "Embedded System Security" of GDR (Groupe de Recherche) SoC-SiP of CNRS
• Member of the program committee of several international conferences and reviewers for several journals
• Participation to the company MoleSystems for the development of a peer-review system
• General Chair of TRUDEVICE’13, Vice-Program Chair of DTIS’14, Program-Chair of DTIS’15, Vice Program Chair of 
ETS’15, Co-General Chair of ISVLSI’15
• Review Chair of DATE conference (since 2012)
• Publication chair of ETS’12, ETS’13, ETS’14, VTS’13, VTS’14
• Publicity chair of the TTEP 
• PC Member of: VTS, ETS, IOLTS, DSD, LATW, DCIS, AQTR, EUC
• IEEE Computer Society Golden Core Member
• "Meritorious Service Award - in recognition of more than 8 years of significant services for TTTC Electronic Media"
• Senior Member of IEEE
Chapter I: Summary
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2. Summary of scientific activities
2.1. Preamble
I have carried out all my studies in Italy. Moreover,  after a PhD in Computer Engineering in the domain of the dependability of 
digital systems at the Politecnico di Torino (Italy), I pursued 4 years of post-doc research at the same institute in the domain 
of reliability and test of digital systems. Thanks to cooperations between the Politecnico di Torino and the LIRMM of 
Montpellier,  I had the opportunity to obtain a post-doc position in France. There, in addition to the topics which were already 
familiar to me (i.e., reliability and test),  I had the occasion to explore a new application domain: the secure devices. At LIRMM 
I have kept on working on test and reliability, with a particular focus on secure devices. My scientific results, students I have 
supervised, my teaching activities, and in general my research projects directly reflects my career path. 
2.2. Current research activities
Research activities I carried on after my nomination as Chargé de Recherche deal with the definition of methodologies  and 
tools for the design,  the test and the reliability of secure digital circuits  and trustworthy manufacturing. More recently, we 
have started a new research activity on the test of 3D stacked Integrated CIrcuits,  based on the use of Through Silicon Vias. 
Moreover, thanks to the relationships I have maintained after my post-doc in Italy, I have kept on cooperating with Politecnico 
di Torino on the topics related to test and reliability of memories and microprocessors.
2.2.1. Secure and Trusted Devices
Security is  a critical part of information and communication technologies and it is the necessary basis  for obtaining 
confidentiality,  authentication, and integrity of data. The importance of security is confirmed by the extremely high growth of 
the smart-card market in the last 20 years. It is reported in "Le monde Informatique" in the article "Computer Crime and 
Security Survey" in 2007 that financial losses due to attacks on "secure objects" in the digital world are greater than $11 
Billions. Since the race among developers of these secure devices and attackers accelerates, also due to the heterogeneity 
of new systems and their number, the improvement of the resistance of such components becomes today’s major challenge.
Concerning all the possible security threats, the vulnerability of electronic devices that implement cryptography functions 
(including smart cards, electronic passports) has become the Achille’s heel in the last decade.  Indeed, even though recent 
crypto-algorithms have been proven resistant to cryptanalysis,  certain fraudulent manipulations on the hardware 
implementing such algorithms can allow extracting confidential information. So-called Side-Channel Attacks have been the 
first type of attacks that target the physical device. They are based on information gathered from the physical implementation 
of a cryptosystem. For instance, by correlating the power consumed and the data manipulated by the device, it is possible 
to discover the secret encryption key.  Nevertheless, this  point is widely addressed and integrated circuit (IC)  manufacturers 
have already developed different kinds of countermeasures.
More recently, new threats  have menaced secure devices and the security of the manufacturing process. A first issue is the 
trustworthiness of the manufacturing process. From one side, secure devices must assure a very high production quality in 
order not to leak confidential information due to a malfunctioning of the device. Therefore, possible defects due to 
manufacturing imperfections  must be detected. This requires  high-quality test procedures that rely on the use of test features 
that increases the controllability and the observability of inner points of the circuit.  Unfortunately, this  is harmful from a 
security point of view, and therefore the access to these test features  must be protected from unauthorized users.  Another 
harm is related to the possibility for an untrusted manufacturer to do malicious alterations to the design (for instance to 
bypass or to disable the security fence of the system). Nowadays, many steps  of the production cycle of a circuit are 
outsourced. For economic reasons, the manufacturing process is  often carried out by foundries located in foreign countries. 
The threat brought by so-called Hardware Trojan Horses, which was long considered theoretical, begins to materialize. 
Chapter I: Summary
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A second issue is the hazard of faults that can appear during the circuit’s lifetime and that may affect the circuit behavior by 
way of soft errors  or deliberate manipulations,  called Fault Attacks. They can be based on the intentional modification of the 
circuit’s environment (e.g., applying extreme temperature, exposing the IC to radiation, X-rays, ultra-violet or visible light, or 
tampering with clock frequency)  in such a way that the function implemented by the device generates an erroneous result. 
The attacker can discover secret information by comparing the erroneous result with the correct one. In-the-field detection of 
any failing behavior is  therefore of prime interest for taking further action, such as discontinuing operation or triggering an 
alarm. In addition, today’s smart cards  use 90nm technology and according to the various suppliers of chip, 65nm 
technology will be effective on the horizon 2013-2014. Since the energy required to force a transistor to switch is reduced for 
these new technologies, next-generation secure systems will become even more sensitive to various classes of fault attacks.
Based on these considerations, within the group I work with, we have proposed new methods, architectures and tools to 
solve the following problems:
• Test of secure devices: unfortunately, classical techniques  for digital  circuit testing cannot be easily used in this  context. 
Indeed,  classical testing solutions  are based on the use of Design-For-Testability techniques that add hardware 
components to the circuit, aiming to provide full controllability and observability of internal states. Because crypto‐
processors  and others cores  in a secure system must pass through high‐quality test procedures to ensure that data are 
correctly processed, testing of crypto chips  faces a dilemma. In fact design‐for‐testability schemes want to provide high 
controllability and observability of the device while security wants minimal controllability and observability in order to hide 
the secret.  We have therefore proposed, form one side, the use of enhanced scan-based test techniques that exploit 
compaction schemes to reduce the observability of internal information while preserving the high level of testability. From 
the other side, we have proposed the use of Built-In Self-Test for such devices in order to avoid scan chain based test. 
• Reliability of secure devices: we proposed an on-line self-test architecture for hardware implementation of the Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES). The solution exploits the inherent spatial replications of a parallel architecture for implementing 
functional redundancy at low cost. 
• Fault Attacks: one of the most powerful types of attack for secure devices is based on the intentional injection of faults (for 
instance by using a laser beam) into the system while an encryption occurs. By comparing the outputs of the circuits  with 
and without the injection of the fault, it is possible to identify the secret key. To face this  problem we have analyzed how to 
use error detection and correction codes as counter measure against this type of attack, and we have proposed a new 
code-based architecture. Moreover, we have proposed a bulk built-in current-sensor that allows  detecting the presence of 
undesired current in the substrate of the CMOS device.
• Fault simulation: to evaluate the effectiveness  of countermeasures against fault attacks, we developed an open source 
fault simulator able to perform fault simulation for the most classical fault models as  well as user-defined electrical level 
fault models, to accurately model the effect of laser injections on CMOS circuits. 
• Side-Channel attacks:  they exploit physical data-related information leaking from the device (e.g. current consumption or 
electro-magnetic emission).  One of the most intensively studied attacks is the Differential Power Analysis (DPA) that relies 
on the observation of the chip power fluctuations during data processing. I studied this type of attack in order to evaluate 
the influence of the countermeasures against fault attack on the power consumption of the device. Indeed,  the 
introduction of countermeasures for one type of attack could lead to the insertion of some circuitry whose power 
consumption is related to the secret key, thus allowing another type of attack more easily. We have developed a flexible 
integrated simulation-based environment that allows validating a digital circuit when the device is attacked by means  of 
this attack. All architectures  we designed have been validated through this  tool. Moreover, we developed a methodology 
that allows to drastically reduce the time required to validate countermeasures against this type of attack.
2.2.2. TSV- based 3D Stacked Integrated Circuits Test
The stacking process of integrated circuits  using TSVs  (Through Silicon Via) is  a promising technology that keeps the 
development of the integration more than Moore’s law, where TSVs enable to tightly integrate various dies in a 3D fashion. 
Chapter I: Summary
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Nevertheless, 3D integrated circuits present many test challenges  including the test at different levels of the 3D fabrication 
process: pre-, mid-, and post- bond tests. Pre-bond test targets the individual dies at wafer level, by testing not only 
classical logic (digital logic, IOs, RAM, etc) but also unbounded TSVs.  Mid-bond test targets the test of partially assembled 
3D stacks, whereas finally post-bond test targets the final circuit. 
The activities carried out within this topic cover 2 main issues:
• Pre-bond test of TSVs: the electrical model of a TSV buried within the substrate of a CMOS circuit is  a capacitance 
connected to ground (when the substrate is  connected to ground). The main assumption is that a defect may affect the 
value of that capacitance. By measuring the variation of the capacitance’s value it is  possible to check whether the TSV is 
correctly fabricated or not. We have proposed a method to measure the value of the capacitance based on the charge/
discharge delay of the RC network containing the TSV. 
• Test infrastructures for 3D stacked Integrated Circuits: testing a die before stacking to another die introduces the problem 
of a dynamic test infrastructure, where test data must be routed to a specific die based on the reached fabrication step. 
New solutions are proposed in literature that allow reconfiguring the test paths  within the circuit, based on on-the-fly 
requirements. We have started working on an extension of the IEEE P1687 test standard that makes use of an automatic 
die-detection based on pull-up resistors.
2.2.3. Memory and Microprocessor Test and Reliability
Thanks to device shrinking and miniaturization of fabrication technology, performances of microprocessors and of memories 
have grown of more than 5 magnitude order in the last 30 years. With this technology trend, it is  necessary to face new 
problems and challenges, such as reliability, transient errors, variability and aging.
In the last five years I’ve worked in cooperation with the Testgroup of Politecnico di Torino (Italy)  to propose a new method to 
on-line validate the correctness of the program execution of a microprocessor.  The main idea is to monitor a small set of 
control signals  of the processors in order to identify incorrect activation sequences. This approach can detect both 
permanent and transient errors of the internal logic of the processor.
Concerning the test of memories, we have proposed a new approach to automatically generate test programs starting from 
a functional description of the possible faults in the memory. 
Moreover, we proposed a new methodology, based on microprocessor error probability profiling, that aims at estimating fault 
injection results without the need of a typical fault injection setup.  The proposed methodology is  based on two main ideas: a 
one-time fault-injection analysis of the microprocessor architecture to characterize the probability of successful execution of 
each of its  instructions in presence of a soft-error, and a static and very fast analysis of the control and data flow of the target 
software application to compute its probability of success. 
Chapter I: Summary
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2.3. Students
After my Ph.D. I have co-supervised 2 post-doc student, 10 Ph.D. students, 1 post-master student,  and 32 master 
students. Table 1 summarizes post-doc (in red), Ph.D. (in blue) and post-master (in green)  students  in chronological order. 
Master students are not listed in this table for sake of simplicity. Section 4 of Chapter 2 will describe the work of each 
student in detail.
Table 1: Summary of the students
2.4. Scientific Projects 
Starting from my Ph.D.,  I have actively cooperated to national- and european-funded scientific projects. The following list 
summarizes, for each project,  the period, the project type and the type of involvement.  Details  concerning each project are 
given in Section 6 of Chapter II.
• 2013-2016: Scientific Leader (for the CNRS)  of the European FP7 Project (STREP) called CLERECO, which is  devoted to 
the early evaluation of the reliability of complex digital systems based on micro-processors, for both embedded systems 
and High Performance Computers.
• 2012-2016: Action Chair (i.e., project leader)  of the COST Action IC1204, TRUDEVICE:  “Trustworthy Manufacturing and 
Utilization of Secure Devices”. This COST action aims at creating a European network of competence and experts on all 
aspects of hardware security including design, manufacturing, testing, reliability, validation and utilization. The network will 
Chapter I: Summary
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play a key role in developing solutions responding to the hardware security challenges, hence strengthening the position of 
Europe in the field. I am the coordinator of the whole Action.
• 2012-2015: Participation to the project MASTER 3D, which is devoted to the study of 3D Stacked Integrated Circuits. 
The project is funded by the European CATRENE program. 
• 2012-2015: Participation to the project HOMERE, which is  devoted to the study of Hardware Trojans. The project is 
funded by the General Directorate for Competitiveness, Industry and Services (DGCIS)  and it is sponsored by the "Secure 
Communications Solutions" competitiveness cluster.
• 2012-2015: Participation to the ANR project LIESSE, which is devoted to the study of vulnerabilities of the physical 
implementation of cryptographic algorithms (CMOS 65, 40, and 28 nm). My group is the leader of the project
• Modeling work laser effects  on circuits will be conducted. The resulting models will be used to develop simulators 
representing physical effects. This  project should enable a better understanding of the physical phenomena involved and 
their experimental application. Its purpose is to propose new principles  of security evaluation circuit vis-à-vis  these attacks 
and validate against-measures.. 
• 2011-2014: Participation to the work package 4 of the project CALISSON 2,  which aims to unite research efforts in order 
to improve the security of integrated circuits for the components market which provides security functions. The project is 
funded by the General Directorate for Competitiveness, Industry and Services (DGCIS)  and it is sponsored by the "Secure 
Communications Solutions" competitiveness cluster. 
• 2010-2013: Participation to the Work Packages 2 and 6  (related to test and security)  of the project PROSECURE, that 
targets  the design and development of an embedded secure microprocessor. This project is funded by the French 
Languedoc-Roussillon region.
• 2008-2011: Participation to TOETS project (European CATRENE CT302) that has the ambition to create a breakthrough 
in methods and flows used by the test technologies by considering the test in the whole value chain from Design to 
Application. A strong consortium composed of European Semiconductor industries, Academics and Small and Medium 
Enterprises has grouped their competences to successfully address this challenge.
• 2007-2010: Participation to the work package 3  of the project CALISSON,  to enhance the security of electronic devices 
by developing new design flows in order to reduce the overall design cost and to increase the Time to Market. The project 
is  funded by the General Directorate for Competitiveness, Industry and Services (DGCIS) and it is sponsored by the 
"Secure Communications Solutions" competitiveness cluster.
• 2004-2006: Participation to TReDiCo within the framework of the Protocol for scientific and technological collaboration 
between the Republic of Italy and Slovak Republic.
• 2001/03: Leader of the Work Package 2 - Task 1 (“BISR for SRAM memories”)  of the project called “TestDOC: Quality 
and Reliability of System-on-chip” funded by the Istituto Superiore M. Boella (www.testgroup.polito.it/tdoc) 
• 2001/03: Participation to the GRAAL project.  The goal of this project was  the implementation of a tool targeting the 
automatic generation of highly dependable SRAMs. It has been developed under the project S167P founded by the Italian 
Ministry of the University and Technological and Scientific Research
• 2000/02: Participation to the framework of the “Giovani Ricercatori” (Young Researchers)  project at Politecnico di 
Torino. The goal of the project was the development of new methodologies to increase the dependability of space 
applications using software techniques.
Chapter I: Summary
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2.5. Teaching activities
Starting from my Ph.D. studies, I have performed various  teaching activities at different levels: engineering students of the 
Politecnico di Torino and the Engineering School of the University of Montpellier 2, master students of the military school of 
the University of Torino, students of private institutions, as well as embedded tutorials on specific scientific topics in 
international conferences. Table 2 summarizes  my pedagogical activities. The column dedicated to the time spent for each 
subject is  classified in 3  set: lectures (i.e.,  “Cours  magistraux”), tutorials (i.e., “Travaux dirigés”),  and practical work (i.e., 
“Travaux pratique”).
Subject Period
Hours
Location
Lectures Tutorials Practical
Automatic Processes
2005/06 42
University of Torino
2004/05 42
Operating 
Systems
2006/07 10 15
Politecnico di Torino
2002/03 20 30
2001/02 20 30
2000/01 20 30
2013/14 12
University of Montpellier 2 (UFR)
2012/13 24
2011/12 12
2007/08 12 15
2005 60 40 Private institution (ENAIP Torino)
2004 16 16 Private institution (ACME Consulting Torino)
Programming Languages
2005/06 20 30
Politecnico di Torino - C
2004/05 10 15
2003/04 10 15
2002/03 10 15
2001/02 20 30
2000/01 10 15
2013/14 15 45
University of Montpellier 2 (Polytech) - C, ASM
2012/13 40 30
2011/12 40 45
2010/11 40 60
2009/10 40 60
2008/09 80
2005 50 50 50 Private institution (ENAIP) - JAVA
2003 10 15 15 Private institution (ACME) - Visual Basic
2003 15 15 Private institution (CTS Ivrea) - VHDL
2002 10 15 15 Private institution (Mezzelani Rome) - C++
Databases
2012/13 12 University of Montpellier 2 (Polytech)
2005/06 10 15
Politecnico di Torino
2004/05 10 15
2001/02 10 15
2000/01 10 15
Digital System Testing
2012/13 12 University of Montpellier 2 (Polytech)
2006/07 15 10 Politecnico di Torino
2009 6 Master SISA - Gardanne
2009 6 International Conferences
Table 2: Summary of the teaching activities
Chapter I: Summary
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2.6. Cooperations
Table 3  summarizes the main cooperations I had since I started my PhD. I showed only cooperations that led to either a 
publication, or a common research or networking project. 
Memory 
Test
μProcessor 
Test
Reliability Security 3D Test Dissemination of 
knowledge
U
N
I
V
E
R
S
I
T
I
E
S
Politecnico di 
Torino
Paolo Prinetto ✓ ✓ ✓
Alfredo Benso ✓ ✓ ✓
Silvia Chiusano ✓
Stefano Di Carlo ✓ ✓ ✓
Angelo Serra ✓
Matteo Sonza Reorda ✓
UBS Guy Gogniat ✓
TIMA Paolo Maistri ✓
Paderborn 
University Sybille Hellebrand ✓ ✓
Slovak Academy of 
Science Elena Gramatova ✓
University of 
Tehran
M. Hosseinabady ✓
Z. Navabi ✓
University of 
Passau Ilia Polian ✓ ✓
TU Delft Said Hamdioui ✓
KUL Ingrid Verbauwhede ✓
ENMSE Jean Max Dutertre ✓
C
O
M
P
A
N
I
E
S
Siemens Monica Lobetti Bodoni ✓
CEA Pascal Vivet ✓
Yogitech Riccardo Mariani ✓
Mentor Schloeffel Juergen ✓
DGA Denis Real ✓
Table 3: Summary of cooperations
Chapter I: Summary
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2.7. Dissemination of knowledge
Executive and Organizing committees
• TRUDEVICE Workshop: General Chair (2013)
• Design and Test of Integrated Circuits (DTIS): Vice-Program Chair (2014) and Program Chair (2015)
• Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference (DATE): Review Chair (from 2012)
• VLSI Test Symposium (VTS): Publication Chair (from 2012), Publicity and Web Chair (from 2006 to 2013)
• European Test Symposium (ETS): Vice-Program Chair (ETS’15), Publication Chair (from 2012)
• Latin American Test Workshop (LATW): Publicity Chair (from 2011)
• South European Test Seminar (SETS): General Chair (2007)
Program committee and reviewer
• Associate Editor of the journal: “Information Security Journal: A Global Perspective”
• Guest Editor of the journal “IEEE Design & Test”
• Guest Editor of the journal “IEEE JETTA: Journal of Electronic Testing - Theory and Applications”
• Reviewer for the following Journals: IEEE Transaction on VLSI, IEEE Transaction on Computer, IEEE Transactions on 
Emerging Topics in Computing, IEEE Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems, Journal of Cryptographic 
Engineering, IEEE Journal of ELectronic Testing - Theory and Applications, IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems, 
Microprocessors and Microsystems, IET Computers & Digital  Techniques, International Journal of Communications, 
Network and System Sciences, IEEE Design and Test of Computers 
• Program Committee: DATE (from 2008  to 2011), LATW (from 2012), VTS (from 2007), IOLTS (from 2010), ETS (from 
2007), DSD (from 2009), DCIS (from 2006), AQTR (from 2004), EAC (from 2014)
• Reviewer for the following conferences: DAC (2013), ITC (from 2008)
GDR SoC-SiP
• Co-Chair of the Technical Activity on "Embedded System Security" of GDR (Groupe de Recherche) SoC-SiP of CNRS, 
from 2009 to 2013.
TTTC
• Chair of the European "Test Technology Technical Council" (www.etttc.org) of IEEE Computer Society (from 2014)
• Vice-Chair of the European "Test Technology Technical Council" (www.etttc.org) of IEEE Computer Society (2010-2013)
• Chair of the Database Group of the "Test Technology Technical Council" (TTTC) of IEEE Computer Society (from 2012) 
• TTTC Test Technology Educational Program (TTEP): Publicity Chair (from 2012)
• Vice-Chair of the Technical Activity on "HARDWARE SECURITY AND TRUST" of IEEE Computer Society TTTC (from 2011)
• Web Master of the "Test Technology Technical Council" (tab.computer.org/tttc) of IEEE Computer Society (from 2004)
Awards and Certificates
• Best paper (Transaction on Computer), awarded by a movie published at “Computing Now” (http://www.computer.org/
portal/web/computingnow/1211/whatsnew/tc)
• "IEEE Computer Society Golden Core Member" (2011)
• "Meritorious Service Award - in recognition of more than 8 years of significant services for TTTC Electronic Media" (2007)
• "Certificate of Appreciation from IEEE Computer Society for serving as TTTC Webmaster in 2006/2007" (2007)
• "Certificate of Appreciation from IEEE Computer Society for serving as TTTC Webmaster in 2004/2005" (2005)
Chapter I: Summary
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2.8. Publications
Table 4 summarizes the number of my publications for each year, classified by book chapters, journal papers (with review 
process), papers published in official proceedings (coming from conferences, symposia or workshops with review process), 
and presentations given in national and international events without official proceedings.
Book Journal Proceedings Presentations Total
Year Chapter Conference Symposium Workshop Invited Workshop Tutorial Poster Demo
2000 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 4
2001 0 1 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 7
2002 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
2003 0 2 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 7
2005 0 0 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 5
2006 0 0 3 5 2 0 0 0 0 0 10
2007 0 1 0 2 1 0 3 0 0 0 7
2008 0 2 1 5 1 0 5 0 0 2 16
2009 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 4
2010 1 1 0 3 0 0 2 1 0 2 10
2011 1 1 1 3 2 0 1 0 0 0 9
2012 0 2 0 3 1 0 4 0 1 0 11
2013 0 5 2 3 3 2 6 0 0 0 21
2014 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Total 2 18 62 35 117
Table 4: Summary of publications
The complete list of publications is given in Chapter 4. The most cited publications are shown in the following list, leading to 
an H-index of 15:
1) 	 [J2] --> 48 citations
2) 	 [S5] --> 37 citations
3) 	 [W1] --> 34 citations
4) 	 [C1] --> 34 citations
5) 	 [S1] --> 31 citations
6) 	 [C7] --> 27 citations
7) 	 [S23] --> 22 citations
8) 	 [W2] --> 22 citations
9) 	 [J4] --> 20 citations
10)	 [S3] --> 19 citations
11)	 [S18] --> 17 citations
12)	 [C5] --> 16 citations
13)	 [S14] --> 15 citations
14)	 [S7] --> 15 citations
15)	 [J3] --> 15 citations
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3. Research activities
This section summarizes the research activities I carried out starting from my master thesis in 1999. 
Research activities at Politecnico di Torino
Since 1999, I worked in the area of digital systems dependability for safety-critical applications at the Politecnico di Torino 
(Italy),  in cooperation with Prof. Paolo Prinetto’s  research group. His  research activity mainly focused on the definition of new 
methodologies and the implementation of tools  able to improve the development of highly dependable systems, at different 
levels: for basic digital components, for systems on chip, up to microprocessor-based systems. My research activity, 
developed during 1 year of master thesis, plus 3  years of PhD and 4 years of PostDoc focused on fault  tolerance, reliability 
and test of digital systems. In particular I worked on the following topics:
• Definition of functional fault models for memories RAM and automatic generation of test sequences (Sections 3.1 and 3.3);
• Software Implemented Hardware Fault Tolerance methods (Section 3.2);
• Implementation of a software techniques  based on the “Programming by Contract” paradigm for the protection of the 
application data (Section 3.4).
Research activities at LIRMM
Starting from December 2006 I started working at LIRMM by focusing mainly on the security of hardware devices. 
In the last decade, integrated systems are being increasingly deployed in many security-critical infrastructures such as 
sensitive governmental organizations, military, and financial/banking systems, where the impact and consequences of 
attacks could be catastrophic. Several types of attacks  have been proposed in literature. Among the most known attacks in 
literature, we have focused on all aspects  of the security that either impact or influence the manufacturing testing, or that 
require the same skills and knowledge strictly related to test and reliability. In particular we worked on the following topics:
• Reliability of the AES (Section 3.5);
• Manufacturing Test of Secure Devices (Section 3.6);
• Fault attacks (Section 3.7)
Besides  the activities on hardware security, we have recently addressed the new challenges related to the test of 3D-SIC 
(Stacked Integrated Circuits).The stacking process of integrated circuits using TSVs (Through Silicon Via)  is  a promising 
technology that keeps the development of the integration more than Moore’s law,  where TSVs enable to tightly integrate 
various dies in a 3D fashion. The problem of testing 3D-SIC and some solutions are described in Section 3.8.
Finally,  in cooperation with the Politecnico di Torino, we propose a new method to on-line validate the correctness of the 
program execution of a microprocessor, as well as  a methodology based on microprocessor error probability profiling that 
aims at estimating fault injection results without the need of a typical fault injection setup. This activity is described in Section 
3.9.
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3.1. Memory BIST and BISR (Master thesis)
During my master thesis I explored an architecture able to increase the reliability of a memory,  based on self-repair features. 
The process of repairing a RAM can be divided into several steps. In a first phase, a test algorithm is executed on the 
memory array.  If a fault is detected, it is  necessary to locate it (diagnosis)  and to allocate redundant memory space to replace 
the faulty cell. When these operations are built-in the RAM architecture,  the steps are named: BIST (Built-In Self-Test), BISD 
(Built-In Self-Diagnosis), BIRA (Built-In Redundancy-Allocation), BISR (Built-In Self-Repair).
I proposed an innovative architecture for SRAM, characterized by BISR  capabilities based on cell-only redundant space 
allocation at the user level. The memory is not electrically repaired, but spare cells  replace faulty ones,  using an on-line ad- 
dress re-mapping scheme. The repair process is transparent to the user, and is independent from the memory physical 
implementation. Moreover, the self-repair architecture is  coupled with an ad-hoc defined on-line transparent BIST algorithm, 
thus implementing a BISTAR (Built-In Self-Test and Repair)  approach. The on-line BIST is therefore executed concurrently 
with the memory normal behavior,  and is able to detect the appearance of a wide range of faults, including coupling faults, 
usually not detectable during end-of-production or power-up tests.
The conceptual idea underlying the proposed approach is  to couple an on-line transparent BIST algorithm with a “functional 
self-repair” architecture in the same BISTAR logic. “Functional self-repair” means  that a faulty cell must be replaced by a 
spare one using an address re-mapping scheme. The BIST part of the logic executes an on-line test, based on a linear 
algorithm, to detect single stuck-at, transition,  coupling, and address faults. Fig. 1 is  a conceptual view of the BISTAR 
architecture. The self-repair logic is  based on a CAM used to re-map the address  of the faulty cells.  The BISTAR  controller is 
in charge of executing the test algorithm and controlling the repair procedures.
The BISR strategy aims at keeping constant the memory storing-capability seen by the user. Faulty cells  are functionally 
replaced by spare ones via a dynamic on-the-fly reconfiguration of the memory-addressing space. From an external user 
point of view, the memory has a nominal addressing space of N cells, of m-bits each. The actual memory module,  instead, 
has  an effective storage capacitance of N+K cells.  To optimize the allocation of the redundant memory space,  the approach 
is  based on a cell-only repair strategy: when a fault is detected in a cell, instead of repairing an entire row or column, only the 
faulty cell is re-mapped on a spare one.
Address  re-mapping is achieved by a	 K-lines  CAM. In particular, the ith line of the CAM stores  the address of the ith faulty cell, 
that is replaced by the first ith spare cell.  This solution allows reducing the area and the routing overhead. Instead of using an 
additional register into the CAM in which is stored the address  of the redundant cell, the association between the line 
position and the redundant cell is hardwired. Whenever a cell of the memory is  accessed, its address is  first looked up in the 
CAM. Two cases can occur:
• If it has  been previously detected faulty (or is currently a cell under test),  its  address has been stored in the CAM. Then, 
when accessed, the CAM reacts with a hit, and outputs the address of the replace cell, and a proper multiplexer routes it 
to the memory array. Any operation on the faulty cell is thus performed on its replacement
• If a spare cell does not currently replace the target cell, its  address, not being stored in the CAM, is directly transferred to 
the memory array.
During testing, the cell under test is isolated by replacing it with a spare one: the original content is copied into the spare cell 
and the CAM content updated for address re-mapping. The test algorithm is  then executed on the cell. If no faults are 
detected, the original content is restored and its re-mapping address in the CAM removed.
This work and its extensions are published in [J1], [J2], [J4], [C1], [C3], [W1], [W2].
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3.2. Software Implemented Hardware Fault Tolerance (PhD Thesis)
The PhD thesis has been carried out in the field of safety critical applications that require high dependability.  The work 
focused on the definition of software techniques  that guarantee the correctness of the system (both hardware and software) 
even in presence of faults.
Electronic systems used in military, avionics and aerospace require high reliability and availability.  Fault-tolerance has always 
been an essential attribute of these systems to keep them operational in harsh environments. For example,  electromagnetic 
interference, power glitches and radiations  can cause transient faults  in electronic systems. Such faults can cause abnormal 
behavior of computer systems. For example, in radiation environment, alpha-particles,  cosmic rays and solar wind flux can 
cause a Single Event Upset (SEU), which is one of the major sources of bit-flips in digital electronics. A bit-flip is  an undesired 
change in the state of a memory cell; a SEU can cause the state of a memory cell to change from 0 to 1 or 1 to 0,  or, in 
combinational circuits, e.g., an arithmetic logic unit, can lead to incorrect computation results. Besides, devices 
miniaturization, increasing clock frequencies and the introduction of microprocessors into electrically active environments 
increase the incidence of SEU also in every day life environments.
Commercial components are usually designed to function in an environment different from that of safety critical  applications, 
thus without fault tolerance capability. If commercial components  have to be used for critical applications with no change in 
hardware, fault tolerance should be provided through software techniques. Software Implemented Hardware Fault Tolerance 
(SIHFT) detects or tolerates  faults in the hardware by software method without any dedicated hardware for error detection or 
fault tolerance.  The benefit of employing SIHFT is that we can improve the availability of the system using the existing design 
of the hardware available in the market. 
To understand the behavior of a computer-based system affected by a SEU when software is  running, we have to model 
and define the errors that occur during program execution. A program can be considered as a sequence of instructions, and 
the execution of the program can be viewed as executing instructions in a desired sequence. For a more precise description, 
we define a basic block as a sequence of instructions without any branching inside or outside except for the last instruction; 
then, a program can be represented by a program graph, which consists of basic blocks and directed edges connecting the 
basic blocks. If the correct execution sequence in the program graph is  broken, it is  a Control Flow error. If the information 
stored in memory is corrupted, it is a Memory error. For example, one of the control flow errors  is a branch creation; the 
correct execution sequence among basic blocks is broken. An example for memory error is the case in which the content of 
a variable is changed because of a bit-flip.
During my PhD, I developed several innovative SIHFT techniques for the control flow checking and for errors in the 
memories:
• Reliable C/C++ Code Compiler for dependable applications (RECCO),  to check memory errors. The technique is based on 
a C/C++ Source-to-Source Compiler able to increase the dependability properties  of a given application. The adopted 
strategies are based on code re-ordering and variable duplication/triplication. The approach can be applied to any C/C++ 
source code, and introduces code modifications that are transparent to the original program functionality. Moreover, it is 
portable to any platform. The RECCO tool, which fully automates the process, allows the user to trade-off between the 
level of dependability improvement and the performance degradation due to the code modification;
• A methodology to compute the criticality of variables in a software application.  Instead of resorting to time consuming fault 
injection experiments, the proposed solution is based on the run/time analysis  of the variables’ behavior logged during the 
execution of the application under different workloads;
• A detailed error analysis  and classification of the behavior of an open-source router, when affected by SEU. The performed 
experiments allow identifying the most critical router variables  according to their impact on system dependability and to 
validate the strategies employed in the RECCO tool to analyze a C software;
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• Control  Flow Checking via Regular Expressions, to check the control flow of a program. The check has inserted at source-
code level using a signature methodology based on regular expressions. The signature checking is performed without 
dedicated watchdog processor but resorting to inter-process communication (IPC)  facilities offered by most of the modern 
Operating Systems;
• A static executable code analysis methodology able to compute, depending on the target microprocessor platform, the 
upper-bound probability that a given application incurs in a Control Flow Error;
• Interposition agents to “wrap” the application software and transparently code all the communications  between the 
application and the surrounding hardware and software environment.
The results of the works carried out during my PhD thesis  have been published in the papers [J3], [C2],  [C5], [C6], [C9], [S1], 
[S4], [S5],  [S9], [S12], [W3], [W4], [W5], [W7],  [P1] referenced in the Publication list.  Moreover, part of the work on memory 
test has been performed in the context of the project “Giovani Ricercatori” (see section 6).
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3.3. Memory Test (Post-Doc at Politecnico di Torino, Italy)
The main issue in memory testing is to define comprehensive fault models  able to carefully represent the most common 
defects occurring in the production phase of the chips. Along with fault models, new test algorithms have to be developed. 
Among the different types of algorithms proposed to test Static Random Access Memories (SRAMs), March Tests have 
proven to be faster, simpler and regularly structured.
A large number of March Tests with different fault coverage have been published; most of them have been generated by 
hand.  The rapid grow of the memory production technologies introduce new classes of faults, such as Dynamic Memory 
Faults, making the task of hand writing test algorithms harder and it may lead to non-optimal results. 
Although some hand-made March Tests to deal with these new faults have been published, the problem of comprehensive 
automatically generating March Tests for memory, for classic and new fault models, also easy to extend to user-defined 
models, was not yet addressed when I started my post-doc.
I proposed a new approach to automatically generate March Tests, starting from a formal model to represent faulty behavior 
in a memory that allows treating the most important classes of memory faults (Dynamic Faults, Static Faults and also Linked 
Faults). The formal model is  based on Functional Fault Model that is  a deviation of the memory behavior from the expected 
one under a set of performed operations. The memory is modeled resorting to a digraph where nodes represent the memory 
states whereas arcs  represent read and write operations.  The automatic generation is  based on a visit of the graph, without 
resorting to exhaustive search. Experimental Results show that newly generated march test can reduce the test complexity, 
and therefore the test time with respect to the state of the art memory tests published before 2005.
The results of the works carried out have been published in the papers  [J5],  [J6],  [J7], [C4],  [C7],  [C8], [C10], [S2],  [S3], [S7], 
[S8], [S11], [W8], [W9], [P3],  [P4] referenced in the Publication list.  Moreover, part of the work on memory test has been 
performed in the context of the project “TestDOC” (see Section 6).
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3.4. Programming by Contracts (Post-Doc at Politecnico di Torino, Italy)
In this field we developed a C++ library called PROMON that encapsulates software techniques to intercept faults that may 
occur during the execution of the application and, block the execution; the innovative aspect of the approach is that the 
implemented methodology relies on the principle of Programming by contract, and on the use of common assertions, pre 
and post-conditions, to ensure that the code follows its expected behavior.
The principle of Design by contract affirms that the interface among the different software modules of a system must be 
regulated by precise specifications, similar to the human contracts: the contract has  to cover the obligations (preconditions), 
the benefits (post conditions) and the consistence among the limits (invariant).
Pre and post-conditions can be manually setup by an expert programmer or can be automatically extracted from the 
analysis of the behavior of each variable during a set of fault-free executions of the application. Pre and post conditions are 
extracted in three phases:
1. Code instrumentation:  in the first step the source code of the application is instrumented so that a set of selected critical 
variables  are “redefined” so that, during the software execution, their behavior can be traced on a log file. Obviously all 
the variables can be redefined but this would in a real case cause an unacceptable overhead.  
2. Golden executions:  in this  phase the user has to run the application with different workloads. During each execution the 
value of each protected variable is logged for later analysis. The choice of the workloads to apply in order to create the 
logs, from which the assertions will be extracted, is a very critical task. In general, the more workloads are used, the 
more the extracted assertions will be precise and less probable to generate “false  negatives” (errors not recognized as 
such);
3. Assertion extraction:  in the last phase, all the log files are analyzed and, for each variable,  a set of assertions is  extracted. 
In this phase the user can also provide PROMON with a set of “user-defined” assertions, maybe difficult to extract but 
known as true by the programmer.
At that point, the value of each protected variable is validated, at run-time, using the extracted assertions; if PROMON finds 
any kind of violation an exception is raised and the execution is stopped. The experiments  showed that the technique results 
in a significant increase of the benchmarks reliability; on the other hand the time overhead introduced by the extra 
computation can increase rapidly depending on the number of the monitored variables.
The results of the works carried out have been published in the papers [C6], [W5], [W6] referenced in the Publication list. 
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3.5. Reliability of the AES (Post-Doc at CNRS)
Standard cryptographic functions such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) are today implemented in a wide range 
of devices targeting various application domains with security requirements.  In addition to the inherent property of these 
devices, allowing storage and transmission of sensitive information across insecure networks,  many applications require high 
reliability for guarantying a proper digital security.  Consequently, as other parts of the system, crypto-cores must be carefully 
designed in order to provide reliable processing of sensible data. Design for on-line testability of such cores  prevents 
structural failures to cause loss of service and compromise the security. 
Fault detection and tolerance schemes for various  implementations  of cryptographic algorithms have been recently 
considered. Mainly, two approaches have been developed: based on information redundancy (e.g. the use of codes)  or 
functional redundancy. 
All the techniques based on codes add some bits to the original data word in order to check its validity. The main issue in 
these approaches  is the prediction of the value of the code on an output, given the input value and the executed operation. 
For instance, the prediction of a parity bit is almost straightforward for the ShiftRows, MixColumns and AddRoundKey 
operations  performed in the AES because these transformations are either linear or they just perform some bit permutations. 
Conversely, the prediction of the parity bit is not trivial for the SubBytes operation performed by the so-called S-Boxes. As a 
consequence, the parity prediction requires larger circuitry. Solutions based on parity codes lead to an overhead of about 
20% and high single fault detection. However they are not effective in case of multiple faults or single faults that lead to an 
even number of errors. Other solutions based on the use of more complex codes such as  CRC or systematic nonlinear 
robust codes lead to higher fault coverage in case of multiple faults but at the expense of a significant area overhead (> 
60%).
Functional redundancy can be used whenever encryption and decryption modules are implemented on the same circuit. 
Each encoding phase is  followed by a decoding and compare phase in order to check if the resulting decoded text matches 
with the initial plaintext. A similar procedure is employed when the circuit is used for decoding a cipher-text.
Conversely to most of the previously proposed approaches that focus on the S-Boxes  only (dominant component, counting 
up to 75% of the circuit area), we proposed a low cost self-test architecture for detecting single and multiple faults in most of 
the AES hardware. The form of testing is accomplished using duplication and comparison. The main idea is  to implement the 
datapath in such a way that several identical blocks can be defined.  With an additional block, online pair wise comparisons 
of blocks are implemented to check the functionality of the AES hardware. Efficiency and low area overhead are achieved by 
exploiting the spatial duplication inherent to the parallel implementation of the algorithm. 
The technique we proposed is  designed for all the AES cores (encryption and decryption)  that use 16  S-Box repetitions. We 
did not consider low-area implementations, where there is only one S-Box at the cost of several clock cycles for completing 
one encryption/decryption round. 
Typical hardware architecture of the AES with 16 S-Boxes is sketched in Figure 2.1. Here, sixteen 8-bit registers feed the 16 
identical S-Boxes (S). Shiftrows involves  only wires for shifting the bytes of the State, it operates on 128  bits. Four identical 
MixColumns blocks operate on 32 bits each. 
Our goal is to identify a partitioning of the circuit that allows  a repetition of identical sub-blocks. These sub-blocks will be 
compared two-by-two for on-line fault detection thanks to the implementation of an extra sub-block.  In the classical 
architecture depicted in Figure 2.1, ShiftRows unfortunately prevents such a partitioning since it operates on all the 128  bits. 
However by inspecting the AES algorithm, it can be seen that SubBytes  and Shiftrows functions can be switched. We thus 
propose to perform ShiftRows before SubBytes,  and even before loading the registers. Therefore, the datapath can be 
divided in 4 identical slices that operate on 32 bits each, and that we called RSMA (32-bits Register, 4 S-Boxes, 1 
Mixcolumns and 32 xor for the Addroundkey operation).
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Figure 2.1: Typical AES Datapath
The main idea of the proposed approach is to use one additional RSMA block, and to compare a pair of RSMA blocks at 
each clock cycle. In particular,  at each clock cycle two blocks are fed by the same inputs  and the related outputs are 
compared in order to detect possible faults. Figure 2.2 details the behavior of a part of the circuit where one extra RSMA 
block has been added. In this  figure, LMux(2), LMux(3) and LMux(4) are multiplexers with an additional output that is 
asserted whenever the two inputs are equal (i.e., a multiplexer with a comparator).  Table 2.1 details the signals controlled 
and observed by the control unit. For instance, when RSMA4 and RSMA3  work together,  the UMux(3)  let the input I(4) go 
into the RSMA3. Among the five signals coming from the comparators, only one at a time is considered by the control unit. 
For example, in the above case, the check(4) signal is verified, i.e., the two related RSMA blocks are checked.
Compared Um Lm To check
RSMA4, RSMA3 1000 11 check(4)
RSMA3, RSMA2 1100 01 check(3)
RSMA2, RSMA1 1110 00 check(2)
RSMA1, RSMA0 1111 00 check(1)
RSMA0, RSMA4 0000 11 check(0)
Table 2.1: Control SIgnals
The scheduling of the comparisons of a pair of RSMA blocks is a very important issue of the proposed method. One AES 
encryption lasts 10 clock cycles and there are 5 different configurations. Therefore it’s  possible to use each of the 5 
configurations twice during one encryption. Through the 5 configurations, each RSMA block is compared twice (once with 
the left block, once with the right block). Thus, if the 5 configurations are activated twice, each RSMA block is compared 4 
times during one encryption. A counter is in charge of the test configuration scheduling.
To validate the proposed architecture, we implemented it in VHDL and we synthesized it using Synopsys Design Compiler , 
and a 130nm CMOS library provided by STM. We considered that all the keys  used in the AddRoundKey step (see Annex I) 
are pre-computed and stored in the circuit. The area of the original circuit is  52961 µm2 (corresponding to 9660 logic cells) 
while the area of the proposed architecture is 71357 µm2 (corresponding to 13084 logic cells and 34.7% of area overhead).
Concerning the efficiency of the proposed architecture with respect to the fault detection, our functional redundancy strategy 
differs from the classical Double Modular Redundancy (DMR) scheme. A classical DMR architecture allows detecting all the 
faults (single and multiple)  that lead to an error (i.e., a difference at the output of one of the duplicated modules). Starting 
from the moment of appearance of the fault, the fault latency depends on the inputs  applied to the circuit, only. In other 
words, the fault is detected as soon as the input vector can sensitize the fault and propagate it up to the output of the 
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module (i.e., the input of the comparator between the two modules).  Anyway, a system based on classical DMR scheme 
does not deliver faulty responses without noticing it (unless in case of equivalent faults in the two modules). 
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Figure 2.2: AES Architecture with RSMA duplication and comparison
This  technique is  able to detect any single or multiple faults leading to a wrong RSMA output value (as for the classical DMR) 
but only when the affected RSMA is compared with another one. Conversely to DMR, the dynamic reconfiguration of the 
modules leads to a comparison of each module twice every 5 clock cycles.  Therefore it can happen that the system 
produces erroneous responses without noticing it even in presence of a single stuck-at.
We questioned the probability to get an error on the AES output and to not detect it. This  probability can be analyzed by 
computing the probability Perr(f)  of not detecting an error on the circuit's outputs while a given fault f affects the circuits.  For 
this analysis we focused on single stuck-at faults only.
Perr(f)  is the probability that the fault f is activated (i.e.  sensitized and propagated in such a way that it leads  to an error)  during 
at least one of the 6  clock-cycles during which the faulty RSMA is not compared, and it is  not activated during the 4 clock 
cycles when the RSMA is compared. Let denote pf the probability of activation of a fault f into an RSMA module, i.e.,  the 
probability that for a random input pattern the fault is sensitized and the error is propagated to its output.  In the hypothesis 
to have several distinct functional inputs, we can consider that the device is  fed by a random source. In addition, the inherent 
properties  of the AES makes that the sequence of input values that are applied to consecutive rounds  of the same 
encryption can be considered as random. Therefore, the probability pf is  equal to the ratio of input vectors that test f over the 
number of possible input vectors. The number of possible input vectors  for the RSMA, is  232.  Since fault simulation cannot 
be applied in exhaustive way, we split the problem in two parts. From one side, S-Boxes have 8  input bits only, consequently 
exhaustive analysis  is possible and pf can be obtained for each fault through simulation.  Since MixColumns and 
AddRoundKey are invertible functions, all the errors  appearing on the output of the S-Boxes propagate through the functions 
to the comparator. From the other side, pf of the MixColumns has been calculated thanks  to its modular structure involving 4 
identical 8-bit inputs sub-functions (28 combinations). Finally, the AddRoundKey operations involve only xor operations and 
are very easily tested.
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For the proposed architecture, the probability that f is not activated during the clock-cycles of comparison is equal to (1-pf)4 
while the probability that f is activated during at least one of the clock-cycles without comparison is equal to 1-(1-pf)6. Finally, 
it comes:
Perr ( f ) = 1! pf( )
4
" 1! 1! pf( )
6( )
Figure 2.3  represents Perr(f) in function of pf. Hard-to-test faults (pf≈0) and the easy-to-test faults  (pf≈1)  are not those that 
most likely produce undetected errors. On the contrary, the maximum value (32.57%) corresponds to faults with pf equals to 
0.14.
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Figure 2.3:  Perr(f)
In order to calculate the error probability of the whole circuit (actually 97% of the circuit, being MixColumns omitted), we fault 
simulated the Sboxes to determine the distribution of probabilities of activation of the faults. Basically, we calculated how 
many faults are activated by one test pattern (pf = 1/256), how many faults  are activated by 2 patterns  (pf = 2/256), and so 
on. Figure 2.4 summarizes, for each probability pf, the number FD(pf) of faults with that activation probability.
!
Figure 2.4: FD(pf)
Assuming that each fault has the same probability to appear in the circuit, the overall error probability PERR of the RSMA is 
calculated as the weighted average of the values Perr(f) according to the distribution FD(p):
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It comes that PERR is equal to 10.18%, i.e. the architecture has a probability of 89.82% to detect any fault in a single 
encryption (10 clock cycles). We also analyzed the evolution of this probability based on the number of encryptions. When 
we perform E encryptions, an RSMA block is compared 4⋅E clock cycles, while it is not compared 6⋅E clock cycles. The 
error probability can therefore be rewritten as follows:
Perr E, f( ) = 1! pf( )
4!E
" 1# 1# pf( )( )
6!E
Considering the fault distribution FD given in Figure 2.5, we can re-calculate the overall error probability PERR of the RSMA 
block in function of the number of encryptions  (Figure 7). As can be seen, the error probability slightly increases  up to 14% 
for 5 encryptions, while for higher encryption numbers it tends to 0. Namely, for 300 encryptions, the reliability probability is 
equal to 99.9%.
Figure 2.5: Error probability w.r.t. the number of encryptions
To conclude, we proposed a low cost architecture for detecting single and multiple faults in the hardware implementation of 
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)  during its  mission mode. The solution, based on spatial redundancy, reorders the 
AES algorithm subtasks. This modification does  not influence the actual encryption function and it allows the implementation 
of 4 identical blocks working on 32-bits each. Thanks to this parallel and duplicated architecture,  only one additional 32-bits 
block is  added in the circuit  leading to 4 tests  per encryption cycle for every block.  The solution is very effective in terms of 
fault latency and fault coverage while keeping the area overhead very low (about 34.7%).
The results  of the works carried out have been published in the papers  [J8], [S13], [S15], [P6],  [p7] referenced in the 
Publication list. 
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3.6. Manufacturing Test for Secure Devices
Structural testing is one important step in the production of integrated circuits. Indeed, the fabrication of CMOS devices is 
not a totally controlled process and some of the manufacturing chips may not work properly. Testing is  therefore essential  to 
sort faulty and good circuits  and thus  ensure the quality of the products. The increasingly test cost of new technologies 
demands the insertion of test-oriented structures early in the circuit design, which is call Design-for-Testability (DfT). These 
structures aims at improving the testability (mainly the capacity to detecting the presence of faults), diagnostics, test time 
and reducing the number of required test pins.
The most common DfT technique is the insertion of scan chains, which increases the observability and the controllability of 
the circuit’s internal nodes, increasing then the testability. Nevertheless, malicious users can use the scan chains to observe 
confidential data stored in devices implementing cryptographic primitives. Therefore, scan chains inserted in secure ICs can 
be considered as a source of information leakage. However, testing cannot be simply avoided in secure products for two 
main reasons: first possible non- tested errors may compromise the system’s security and as for any other IC, the test 
ensures the quality of the product.
Besides  the security threat that lies in the scan chains, standard test interfaces such as JTAG and IEEE 1500 can also be 
maliciously exploited.  These test interfaces that initially developed for testing printed circuit boards (JTAG)  or System-on-
Chip internal modules (IEEE 1500), can be used nowadays for debugging purposes. Easy access to debug ports and 
module’s test structures can be used by hackers to steal the contents of on-chip memories (intellectual property)  and to 
modify the firmware/software so that the device executes a function which was not initially conceived by the designer. In 
order to protect intellectual property the security of these ubiquitous test interfaces must be improved.
In the last 5 year we have analyzed the weaknesses of standard DfT architectures based on the use of scan chains,  and we 
have proposed new countermeasures to cope with this hazard. The following subsections will summarize our main 
contributions. The rest of the section is structured as follows: 
1. a description of the basic approach the allows successful scan attacks, followed by new attacks we proposed;
2. the countermeasures we have proposed to cope with those attacks. We have investigated solutions based on Built-In 
Self-Test, on the internal comparison of test and expected responses, the implementation of a smart controller, and the 
enhancement of the security of the JTAG standard.
3.6.1. Scan Attacks
The insertion of scan chains consists of replacing the flip-flops  (FFs) of the design by scan flip-flops (SFFs)  and connecting 
these SFFs into a shift-register, called scan chain. The scan chain is bound to a input pin (scan-in)  and to an output pin 
(scan-out).  An extra pin called scan-enable should be added to control the scan chain’s data shifting. If the scan-enable is 
set to 0, the SFFs are connected to the circuit to behave as  functionally expected (functional mode). When the scan-enable 
is  set to 1, then the SFFs are connected to the scan chain, and the bit-stream at the scan-in is  shifted in while the data 
stored in the SFFs is shifted out through the scan-out pin.
The attacker may use the shift operation maliciously in order to discover the secret key of a cryptographic algorithm that is 
stored within the circuit. An attack would consist of the following steps:
1. Reset the circuit;
2. Load the chosen input at the cipher’s input;
3. Run part of the encryption (functional mode on); 
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4. Switch to test mode when the intermediate flip-flops contain data related to the secret and shift out the scan contents 
containing this confidential information;
5. Analyze the observed contents and try to uncover the secret key. If there is not enough information, repeat the process 
for another chosen inputs.
In order to reduce the complexity of the procedure, most attacks relies  on the so-called differential analysis. This strategy 
makes use of pairs  of cipher inputs  (that differentiates for few bits) and calculate the differences  (Hamming distances)  from 
the output related to these pairs.  This technique allows revealing only the bit that changed from one input to the other, and it 
removes all involved constant values. All the known scan-based attacks use this principle to collect scan data.  In the last 
years, the literature have seen a succession of papers  proposing a new scan attack, followed by a paper proposing the 
related countermeasure. In this context, we have proposed several scan attacks  that showed their effectiveness even in 
presence scan compression/compaction schemes  that were considered (before our paper)  an intrinsic countermeasure 
against scan attacks.
Advanced DfT Structures & Security
Structural test consists in applying test patterns  to the circuit  under test.  These patterns are being derived from the circuit's 
structure (logic gates netlist) and a fault model (e.g. stuck-at faults).  In addition to structural test,  DfT approaches are 
required for improving fault coverage and thus product quality.  The most widely used methodology for structured DfT is the 
so-called scan chain.  The circuit’s flip-flops are replaced by scan flip-flops and then connected to each other in order to form 
a shift register (scan chain):  the first scan flip-flop in the chain is connected to the scan-in port and the last one to the scan-
out port (see Fig. 2.6.a). The scan chain provides full controllability and observability of storage elements and thus of the 
circuit’s internal states. Possibly, sufficient fault coverage is achieved with only some of the flip-flops within the scan chain, 
leading to the so-called partial-scan design.
We define here three types of scan flip-flops depending on the stored value. This classification is  valid for any device with 
cryptographic blocks and it will help the description of the attack throughout the paper. Independent flip-flops (IFFs)  store 
data that is independent from crypto inputs. Dependent flip-flops  (DFFs)  store data that depends on crypto inputs but is 
independent from secret data (e.g. input buffers of the cryptographic block). Secret flip-flops (SFFs) store data that depends 
on the secret key. An example showing these three types of flip-flops is depicted in Fig. 2.6.b. It contains 4 IFFs, 3  DFFs and 
3  SFFs. It must be noted that this classification is only valid for a given time-step during computation. For instance, a FF may 
contain a datum depending only on the input value at a given instant, while it may contain datum depending on the secret 
key at another instant. Thus, the attacker should predict the instant when secret is  stored in the scan chain, in order to shift 
out the test data and analyze it to calculate the secret.
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Fig. 2.6: (a) Scan flip-flops in the scan chain; (b) Example of a device with cryptographic block
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There are two operating modes  in scan designs: functional mode and shift mode. These modes are differentiated by using 
an extra test signal (scan-enable). In functional mode, the scan design operates within the functional configuration. The shift 
mode is used to shift test patterns in and shift test responses out. In order to test the circuit, test patterns are loaded from 
the scan-in while the primary inputs are set accordingly to the test. Then the circuit  is switched to functional mode for one 
cycle to capture the circuit’s  internal state into the scan chain. Finally, data captured in the scan chain are shifted out through 
the scan-out port for response observation. 
In complex designs a scan chain may contain thousands of sequential cells. Unfortunately, long scan chains have a negative 
impact on test time due to the required shift operations at every test pattern. In this case, multiple scan chains  are 
implemented requiring as many scan-in and scan-out pins as the implemented scan chains. In order to meet the number of 
design digital pins, certain methods are used for reducing the number of visible scan chains. Compression is used to reduce 
the number of bits in test vectors. An on-chip decompressor is then implemented to regenerate the full test vectors to the 
scan chain inputs from the compressed test sequence. On the scan-out side, the number of scan-out pins  is reduced using 
so-called compaction structures. Compactors are usually implemented using XOR trees containing one or several outputs. If 
one fault is captured by one scan flip-flop then it propagates through one of the compactor outputs and becomes 
detectable.
Another structure commonly seen in structural tests is the mask decoder. Its goal is to mask the presence of unpredictable 
values (called X’s)  that may corrupt test output data and thus lower fault coverage and diagnosis. These X’s are due to 
uninitialized memories  and flip-flops, or bus contention. The mask decoder is fed by test inputs and, based on the input 
value, it deactivates some scan chains (those that contain an X). 
An example of spatial compaction is shown in Fig. 2.7. In this  example, the 20 scan flip-flops are distributed over 4 scan 
chains and form 5 slices. A slice is  made of flip-flops belonging to the same rank in the scan chains. In this  example the 
content of the flip-flops within a slice is compacted in a single bit by the response compactor. H[i] is the result of slice i 
compaction. Hereafter, we assume a single output compactor. From an attacker’s point of view this is the worst-case 
scenario, since observability is reduced to a minimum: all slices’ elements are compacted into a single bit. When a multi-
output compactor is used, the attacker can simply compute H[i] by XORing the bits on the outputs.
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Fig. 2.7: Example of circuit with spatial compaction and mask decoder
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We shall use the example of Fig. 2.7 throughout the paper for explanatory purposes.  While this  example is  quite simple,  it 
must be noted that the slices contain all possible combinations of various scan flip-flop types (SFFs, DFFs, IFFs).
In a single chain or multiple scan-chains scenario without compaction, values related to secret data are left unchanged in the 
observed scan-out bitstream. In presence of response compaction, secret-related data (SFFs)  compacted with other data, 
such as data stored in IFFs  and/or DFFs. This makes the previously mentioned scan-attacks impossible.  The mask decoder 
also makes the attack more difficult. From the test engineer’s  point of view, the mask is used to filter the unpredictable 
values. On the other hand, an attacker that has no knowledge of the DfT structure cannot predict the presence/position of 
X’s. Therefore, when he shifts out the internal states, he is not able to set correctly the mask. In this  case, X’s may corrupt 
the test outputs, making the attack impossible. Other issue caused by the improper use of the mask decoder is that it may 
mask data related to the secret instead of X’s  and thus only part of the secret related data is observable at the output.  The 
same occurs in case of partial scan designs, where only a subset of flip-flops are inserted into the scan chain and in the case 
of MISR compaction, where the final signature is the only information delivered to eventual hackers.
To sum up, in the presence of such advanced DfT structures, exploiting test outputs in order to expose the secret is  far more 
challenging than setting scan attacks on single-scan chain designs. However, the work we proposed demonstrates how to 
set up scan attacks on advanced scan designs, showing how to exploit test outputs, even when only part of the SFFs are 
observable in the test output.
Definitions and Assumptions
Scan attacks compromise system security because the test infrastructures  can be used to observe internal states.  The 
following procedure is used (several times) in the attack to unload the circuit’s internal state into the test output.
Procedure 1. Collecting internal states into test output
1. Reset the circuit;
2. Load a chosen plaintext M (message);
3. Run the crypto algorithm until it executes the first operation on the plaintext, based on the value of a secret key, and store in-
termediate values in SFFs;
4. Switch from normal mode to shift mode;
5. Shift out the scan data;
In order to determine the time required to run the crypto algorithm, the attacker uses the information described in the device 
datasheet or SPA (Simple Power Analysis), which may help find out the number of cycles. The attacker repeats Procedure 1 
for some messages and then analyzes the data observed on the scan-out.  The attacker must identify which data in the 
scan-out stream correspond to the data stored in SFFs. For single-chain scenarios it is  very straightforward to analyze the 
scan-out data. However in the presence of industrial DfT structures it requires special considerations detailed below. 
The attack rely on the differential analyses, which assess  differences instead of direct values, are well-known in the hardware 
security community. Several studies using Differential Power Analysis (DPA) or Differential Fault Analysis (DFA)  relying on 
differential values instead of direct values have been validated as methods for compromising the security of hardware 
implementations. The above has two main advantages: eliminating some issues  introduced by spatial compaction and 
helping the attacker find out which bits of the observed test output bit stream are related to the secret data. 
In the context of scan-attack, the attack relies on the analysis of the difference between two test output vectors.
The example of Fig. 2.7 will be used hereafter since it is representative of all possible flip-flop combinations  between SFFs, 
DFFs and IFFs. As seen in Fig.  2.7,  H represents the response vector, therefore H[1] is the first element of this vector 
(corresponding to slice 1) and so on. The equations for all test output bits i are described by Eq. 1-5:
H[1] = I0  ⊕ I1 ⊕ I2      (1)
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H[2] = I3   ⊕ S0 ⊕ S1      (2)
H[3] = S2  ⊕ D0 ⊕D1      (3)
H[4] = S3  ⊕ I4 ⊕ X      (4)
H[5] = S4  ⊕ S5 ⊕ S6      (5)
The differential analysis described in Procedure 2 basically consists in executing Procedure 1 for several pairs of input 
messages in order to observe the differences in the information stored within the scan chain(s) when the message changes:
Procedure 2. Differential Scan Analysis
1. Execute Procedure 1 with cipher input Mj (message) and observe the test response Hj (an array containing five bits: H[1] to 
H[5]);
2. Execute Procedure 1 with cipher input Mk and observe the test response Hk;
3. For each index i of the arrays Hj and Hk:
4. Store in Diffj,k[i] the difference (XOR) between H[i] j and H[i] k;
By repeating Procedure 2 for several pairs of messages (Mj, Mk), the attacker obtains several arrays of differences, hereafter 
called measured signature (each test response bit i has a signature denoted hereafter Diff [i]):
Diff [i] = Diff0,1[i] ||Diff2,3[i] ||Diff4,5[i] || Diff6,7[i] ||…
Applying the pair of messages (Mj, Mk) to the example of Fig. 2.7 we obtain Eq. 6-10:
Diffj,k [1] = I0j    ⊕ I0k   ⊕ I1j   ⊕ I1k  ⊕ I2j  ⊕ I2k  (6)
Diffj,k [2] = I3j    ⊕ I3k   ⊕ S0j  ⊕ S0k  ⊕ S1j  ⊕ S1k  (7)
Diffj,k [3] = S2j  ⊕ S2k  ⊕ D0j  ⊕ D0k  ⊕ D1j  ⊕ D1k   (8)
Diffj,k [4] = S3j  ⊕ S3k  ⊕ I4j    ⊕ I4k  ⊕ X4j  ⊕ X4k   (9)
Diffj,k [5] = S4j  ⊕ S4k  ⊕ S5j  ⊕ S5k  ⊕ S6j  ⊕ S6k   (10)
Since only cipher inputs differ between the first and second execution of Procedure 1 (line 1 and 2), IFFs are not affected by 
Mj and Mk and store the same values, thus  differences between the values stored in any IFF for any two different messages 
Mj and Mk amount to 0. It implies that the equations (6)-(10) can be rewritten as:
Diffj,k [1] = 0        (11)
Diffj,k [2] = S0j  ⊕ S0k  ⊕ S1j  ⊕ S1k     (12)
Diffj,k [3] = S2j  ⊕ S2k  ⊕ D0j ⊕ D0k ⊕ D1j ⊕ D1k    (13)
Diffj,k [4] = S3j  ⊕ S3k  ⊕ Xj  ⊕ Xk      (14)
Diffj,k [5] = S4j  ⊕ S4k ⊕ S5j  ⊕ S5k  ⊕ S6j  ⊕ S6k    (15)
Since Diffj,k[1] is  related to a slice that contains only IFFs, there is  no input pair that can provoke a difference in that particular 
output bit (see Eq.  11). By observing the test outputs,  the attacker can observe which output bits H[i] never change and 
deduce that they are only related to IFFs, as the example of Eq. 11.
The cases of Eq. 12 and Eq. 15 correspond to slices with only SFFs  and IFFs (the differential analysis eliminated the 
differences  coming from IFFs).  The proposed attack (as shown below)  allows  the attacker to find out which output bits are 
only related to SFFs and IFFs  and retrieve the key related to those SFFs.  It is important to remember here that the DfT 
structure is completely unknown to the attacker, i.e. the attack method is independent of the DfT structure. 
The presence of X’s can also complicate the attack. In a normal test procedure,  applying an appropriate mask eliminates the 
X's. On the other hand, the attacker has no knowledge on the DfT structure, and then the avoidance of X’s is not ensured. 
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When the proposed procedure fails to identify H[i] values of interest, the attacker must provide new inputs to the device, 
knowing that these inputs will affect the mask (even if the attacker does not know how the mask is affected).
Proposed Attack (Signature Attack)
The principle of the signature attack is to characterize all signatures (Diff [i])  for a set of input pairs, for all possible key 
guesses. Since the distribution of the SFFs amongst the slices is unknown to the attacker, this  has to be done for all possible 
subsets of SFFs observable at the output.  The characterized signatures must be different so that a measured signature 
(Procedure 2)  corresponds to only one characterized signature.  In other words, the measured signature can be generated by 
only one key and only one subset of observable SFFs. Thus, the signature attack consists in two phases: characterizing all 
possible signatures (via simulation) and obtaining the measured signature (in the attacked device, via Procedure 2).
Fig.  2.8  depicts the signature simulation process when all SFFs are observable and affect the same test output bit. For each 
possible subset of observable SFFs a similar table must be simulated. If N is  the number of SFFs, then there are 2N possible 
observable subsets (and corresponding tables).
!
Fig. 2.8: Simulated signatures for possible subsets of observable SFFs
Besides  simulating these signatures, simulated signature must be unique, i.e. there are no duplications among all the table 
lines (signatures). This property (uniqueness) allows the measured signature to match a single simulated signature with only 
one key and subset table. Obviously,  the number of signatures to be simulated is exponentially increased by the number of 
SFFs and by the number of bits of the key. We have shown that in practice we can use some techniques to focus on small 
groups of key bits and SFFs at a time, to make feasible the simulation of signatures.
The second phase of the signature attack consists in retrieving the measured signature from the device. For that purpose, 
the attacker applies the same set of input pairs (Mj, Mk) from the simulation phase (the one with uniqueness property). Then 
he applies Procedure 2 for each pair,  and creates measured signatures. Each output bit stream Hj corresponds to a 
message Mj.  For each pair of messages (Mj, Mk)  the attacker calculates the difference between Hj and Hk. After applying 
some pairs each test output bit H[i] has a measured signature consisting in a series of differences.
Once all measured signatures are obtained, the attacker compares them to the simulated signatures (from Fig. 2.8). If one 
test output bit H[i] depends only on SFFs and/or IFFs (such as H[3] and H[5]), the measured signature for this  slice will match 
one of the simulated signatures. The matching signature corresponds to the subset of SFFs observed in that test output bit 
H[i], and reveals the key guess that corresponds to the secret key.
Since the signatures  are computed from the SFFs values, this attack works only if the design contains some slices with only 
SFFs and IFFs. If the SFFs  always  mixed with DFFs within the slices, the attack fails, since the observed signatures are 
corrupted by the values stored in the DFFS. We have therefore extended this attack to this case.
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Enhanced Attack 
If a SFF is  compacted along with a DFF (for instance see output H[3], see Eq. 13), then the parity obtained from the 
corresponding slice cannot be exploited by scan-attacks. However, today’s designs certainly contain some DFFs (e.g. input 
registers)  that will be part of the scan chains and are mixed with SFFs. Then, in order to widen the scope of the attack, we 
proposed an extension that copes with the presence of DFFs. 
The principle of the attack cannot be directly extended to the presence of DFFs  since the attacker cannot predict (simulate) 
their value to compute signatures. Therefore,  here we show that using two additional identical circuits with known secret 
keys, the attacker can manage to eliminate the parity of values stored in DFFs and then analyze the parity of SFFs, which 
reveals the secret key of the attacked circuit.
Fig.  2.9.a shows a slice of the DfT structure with SFFs and DFFs. SFFs are part of the intermediate register while DFFs are 
related to the input through an unknown (to the attacker) function FU. Given the input pair (Mj,  Mk),  the attacker can 
measure the test output H difference (Diffj,k). Output H has two components: the parity of SFFs (HS) and parity of DFFs (HD), 
as  shown in Fig. 2.9.b. A priori the attacker does not know either of these components.  For the input pair (Mj, Mk), a 
difference on HS is called SDiffj,k and a difference on HD is called DDiffj,k.
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Fig. 2.9: (a) Example of slice with SFFs and DFFs with unknown function; (b) Equivalent DfT structure
In order to retrieve the HS component (then measure the signature dependent only on SFFs) the attacker must have access 
to two other identical circuits for which he or she knows the secret keys. The circuits being identical, the DfT is also identical. 
Then circuits A and B  have distinct secret keys KEYA and KEYB. The attacked circuit is called C and its secret key is KEYC. 
The attack is divided into two steps. First the attacker uses A and B  to find out the component HD for a sequence of input 
pairs, then applies the same sequence of input pairs  to circuit C, to finally measure the signature at H and remove the 
component HD. Afterwards, the result obtained is a measured signature HS dependent on the KEYC.
First, the attacker applies  the sequence of input pairs  that generates unique signatures to both circuits A and B. Afterwards, 
he or she measures the differences at the output H. The measured signature for a circuit X, called MSIGX,  is a concatenation 
of the output differences for each input pair:
  MSIGX = Diff0,1X || Diff2,3X || Diff4,5X || Diff6,7X ||…      (16)
The measured signatures for circuits A, B and C can be written as Eq. 17-19:
  MSIGA = SDiff0,1A ⊕ DDiff0,1 || SDiff2,3A ⊕ DDiff2,3 || SDiff4,5A ⊕ DDiff4,5 ||…   (17)
  MSIGB = SDiff0,1B ⊕ DDiff0,1 || SDiff2,3B ⊕ DDiff2,3 || SDiff4,5B ⊕ DDiff4,5 ||…   (18)
  MSIGC = SDiff0,1C ⊕ DDiff0,1 || SDiff2,3C ⊕ DDiff2,3 || SDiff4,5C ⊕ DDiff4,5 ||…   (19)
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The terms DDiffj,k are the same for the three measured signatures because the component HD is  independent from the 
secret key. Next, the attacker calculates the difference between the measured signatures MSIGA and MSIGB:
  MSIGA ⊕ MSIGB = SDiff0,1A ⊕ SDiff0,1B ||SDiff2,3A ⊕ SDiff2,3 B …    (20)
All DDiffj,k terms are eliminated in Eq. 20, leading to values depending only on SDiffj,k terms, since DDiffj,k terms never change 
in the 3  measured signatures. The secret keys KEYA and KEYB are known, but the attacker does not know which SFFs 
subsets belong in the attacked slice. This information must be known to derive the KEYC.  For each subset of observable 
SFFs there is  only one simulated signature table. If Ns is the number of SFFs in the intermediate register, there are 2Ns 
possible subsets of observable SFFs, and thus 2Ns signature tables. Each signature table has different signatures for KEYA 
and KEYB (uniqueness property).  One of these signature tables must contain the signatures for KEYA and KEYB, which are 
expressed in SDiffj,k terms (the simulation considers only SFFs). In order to find out which table contains the right signatures, 
the attacker calculates the difference of signatures  for the KEYA and KEYB for each table. The signature table with a match 
corresponds to the SFFs subset compacted in the attacked slice. Additionally, this signature table contains the signature for 
circuits A and B (with SDiffj,k terms only):
  SIGA = SDiff0,1A || SDiff2,3A || SDiff4,5A ||…       (21)
  SIGB = SDiff0,1B || SDiff2,3B || SDiff4,5B ||…       (22)
In order to find the component HD of the signature the attacker computes the difference between SIGA and MSIGA, 
eliminating the SDiffj,k terms:
  DDiff0,1 || DDiff2,3 || DDiff4,5 ||…       (23)
The final step consists  in adding Eq. 23  to the measured signature of circuit C (Eq. 19) to obtain a signature of C free of DFF-
dependent terms. The attacker proceeds  by searching in the simulation table that corresponds to the subset of SFFs 
(obtained early in this section) the signature matching the signature of C. The matching line corresponds to the right key 
(KEYC).
Conclusions
With this work we presented a new scan-based attack. It  is generic and can be easily adapted to different classes of 
symmetric and asymmetric ciphers such as AES, DES, Khazad, ECC, RSA and ElGamal. It works against advanced DfT 
structures such as  response compaction, mask decoders and time compaction. Additionally it  does not require advanced 
knowledge of the circuit or test structure details. It has been applied to various gate-level netlists in order to validate the 
approach.
The results of these works have been published in the papers [J12], [J13], [S22], [S23],  [S25], [S27], [W15] referenced in the 
Publication list.
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3.6.2. Countermeasures against Scan Attacks
This  subsection presents  4 countermeasures that we proposed in the last 5 years. The first basic (and trivial) 
countermeasure against scan attacks is  based on not using scan chains. A Built-In Self-Test approach is  used instead. The 
second proposed countermeasure is based on the internal comparison of actual test responses and expected ones (that 
must be provided by the external tester). The comparison is performed vector-wise not to allow scan attacks. The third 
countermeasure is a smart and small test controller that does not impact the test procedure,  while guaranteeing the security 
against the scan attacks.  The last approach is an authentication method embedded in the JTAG standard to allow 
authentication of both the circuit to the tester and from the tester to the circuit.
Built-In Self Test
One approach for providing test solutions at different stages of an IC life cycle consists  in including Built-In Self-Test (BIST) 
resources  into the Circuit Under Test (CUT). Classically, storage elements are organized into scan chains and additional 
hardware is  used for feeding the scan chains with pseudorandom test data, and sinking the test responses before analysis 
of the compressed signature. So, BIST does not provide full  controllability and observability of the internal storage elements 
from the IC interface. This major difference with the external testing strategy makes the scan- based attacks not exploitable. 
However,  BIST must be implemented at low cost and its efficiency must be demonstrated in terms of fault coverage and test 
length.
Security provided by block cipher algorithms such as DES and AES relies on two main properties named Diffusion and 
confusion.  Confusion refers to making the relationship between the key and the ciphertext as complex and involved as 
possible. Diffusion refers  to the property that redundancy in the statistics of the plaintext is dissipated in the statistics of the 
ciphertext. For diffusion to occur, a change in a single bit of the plaintext should result in changing the value of many 
ciphertext bits. These properties  are supported by the Feistel network for the DES and by the substitution–permutation 
network for the AES. AES and DES also have two common characteristics. First, they are iterative algorithms. DES is 
composed of 16 rounds while AES is made of 10 rounds. All rounds are (quasi)  identical, i.e.,  the result of a round is used as 
the input of the next round. Second, since encryption/decryption are bijective operations for a given key, each round is a 
bijective operation too (on a set of 264 elements for DES on a set of 2128 elements for AES).
The diffusion property is a very interesting feature with regard to the test of their hardware implementation. It implies that 
every input bit of a round influences many output bits, i.e., every input line of a round is in the logic cone of many output bits. 
In other words, an error caused by a fault in the body of the round is very likely to propagate to the output. Thus, the circuit 
is  very observable. Moreover, since rounds are bijective,  the input logic cone of every output contains many inputs. In other 
words, each fault is highly controllable. Therefore, these circuits are highly testable by nature whatever the implementations. 
Fig.  2.10  presents a typical implementation of the AES or DES crypto-algorithm. It is  mainly composed of a Key Generation 
module and a Round module. In mission mode, after an initial operation (XOR between Key and Plaintext for AES, and 
permutation of the plaintext for DES), the plaintext block is looped around the Round module several times (10 for AES, 16 
for DES)  before the final cipher is loaded into the R-out register, possibly after a final operation like the final permutation in 
DES. The widths of the data are 128 for AES and 64 for DES.
The idea of the BIST architecture is to use the circuit as it  is, by slightly modifying the Control unit so that the circuit performs 
more than the nominal rounds. In other words, we expected that thanks to the intrinsic easiness of being tested, by letting 
run the circuit for several clock cycles, the final fault coverage will  be high enough. We have conducted a theoretical study 
that allows calculating in advance the number of encryptions needed to reach 100% fault coverage with a given confidence 
level. The theoretical number of required encryptions for 100% fault coverage is then confirmed by fault simulation.
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Fig. 2.10: Implementation of the crypto-algorithm
We considered the following aspects: 
1. The stream generated by a crypto-algorithm when the input is fed by its output can be considered as random. 
2. The presence of a fault modifies the round output and thus the next test pattern (circular scheme). This is taken into 
account in our experiments  in which we injected every single stuck-at fault, fault simulated the circuit, and only observed 
the value of the final signature produced by the crypto-core (DES or AES).
3. One of the operations of the crypto-algorithm is  a substitution function that is  implemented by S-boxes. S-boxes 
represent the largest part of the crypto-cores. Their inputs are independently fed by a subpart of the round inputs. We 
can therefore assume that they are fed by a random source, receiving a pattern every clock cycle. 
4. An S-box needs k deterministic patterns to be fully tested and it receives one random pattern every clock cycle.
5. Other parts of the round module (mainly wires and XOR operations) receive one pattern every clock cycle as  well.  Since 
the other parts have lower complexity than the S-boxes, it can be expected that they will be fully tested by the time the 
S-boxes received a sufficient number of test patterns.
The theoretical  number of required clock cycles (or patterns) can be precomputed as  the theoretical number of clock cycles 
for testing the S-boxes. The following equation gives  the length (n)  of the minimal-length random sequence that includes the 
k targeted test patterns with a given confidence level P, with p being the probability of each pattern to appear:
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We applied the equation to both the DES and the AES.
For the DES algorithm, we considered a confidence level of P=99%  for a sequence of k=64 patterns. This sequence 
represents an upper bound since it corresponds to the exhaustive test set for any six-input S-box. Each pattern has  the 
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same probability to appear in the pseudorandom scheme, i.e.,  p=1/64. From the equation, it comes that the minimal-length 
random sequence is n=540 patterns. According to the implementation of the S-boxes and the actual number of required 
test patterns k (that is usually smaller than 64), the length of the test procedure can vary from 440 clock cycles  (28 
encryptions)  to 540 cycles (34 encryptions). Experimental results  confirmed our hypothesis. We fault simulated the DES with 
several keys and initial input messages. After 25 encryptions (i.e., 400 clock cycles), the whole circuit (round module and 
control module) has always been fully tested.
For the AES algorithm, it comes that the minimal random sequence length should include n=2593  random patterns for 
exhaustively testing the AES S-boxes (k=256) with a confidence level of 99%. For various implementations of the AES S-
boxes and thus for different deterministic test sets,  we calculated the length of the random sequence for including the k 
targeted deterministic patterns. The minimal length is  ranging from 2400 to 2593  patterns depending on the implementation. 
This  hypothesis  has been confirmed during the experiments since 100%  fault coverage has been achieved on the whole 
circuit (round module, key generation module, controller) after 210 encryptions (i.e.,  2100 rounds). This experiment has been 
repeated with different plaintexts and secret keys as starting points, and we obtained test sequences ranging from 2100 to 
2500 patterns.
To conclude,  BIST approaches are effective for secure circuits since they have the intrinsic property of being easily 
controllable and observable. Since BIST does  not rely on visible scan chains, it is a natural countermeasure against scan-
based attacks.  Conversely to standard BIST solutions, the technique we proposed entails a negligible area overhead. The 
principle of the self-test procedure is  to feed the core with its own output and let the device run for a certain number of 
encryptions, and then to compare the output of the final encryption with a precomputed signature.  In a very short test time, 
100% of fault coverage is  achieved.  Nevertheless, BIST approaches do not allow diagnosis of faults, nor debug of possible 
problems.
The results of this work have been published in the paper [J9] referenced in the Publication list.
Internal Comparison
A common industrial practice to avoid scan-based attacks is  to physically disconnect the scan chains after production 
testing by blowing fuses located at both ends of the scan chains.  However, this  solution impedes the testing of those 
devices requiring being tested after manufacturing. In particular, the correct behavior of the secure circuits should be 
validated after the introduction of the secret key, which can be programmed at any time of the circuit’s lifecycle. This  secured 
information can indeed be owned by any circuit producer (e.g. designer, manufacturer, system integrator) or user (e.g., 
reseller or final customer). In addition, scan disconnection stops any further analysis, e.g. diagnostic, or cannot be 
considered as an appropriate response to the scan attack if the connection can be reconstructed. 
In the standard scan-based test mechanism, FFs are replaced by Scan Flip-Flops (SFF)  and are connected so that they 
behave as  a shift register in test mode. The output of one SFF is connected to the input of next SFF. The input of the first FF 
in the chain is directly connected to an input pin (Scan-In) while the output of the last FF is directly connected to an output 
pin (Scan-Out). An additional signal (Scan-Enable)  selects whether SFFs have to behave normally or as a shift register.  The 
test procedure is composed of 3  steps: first, test patterns are shifted-in via the scan chain (i.e.,  by keeping Scan-Enable=1) 
for #SFF clock cycles (where #SFF is the number of SFFs in the chain).  Second, one or two functional clocks (i.e.,  Scan-
Enable=0)  are applied to capture the circuit’s response. Usually, one clock cycle is used for static faults, while 2 (or even 
more)  clock cycles  are used for dynamic faults.  Finally, the content of SFFs is shifted out for #SFF clock (again, with Scan-
Enable=1) to allow the ATE to compare the obtained values with respect to the expected ones.
The principle of the approach we proposed is to compare the actual responses with the expected ones within the chip 
boundaries instead of scanning-out the actual responses and comparing it within the ATE. In order to guarantee that secure 
data cannot leak outside the chip, the output of the comparison is not bitwise delivered to the ATE, but only after applying 
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and comparing the whole test vector (i.e., after comparing the value of each SFF). Therefore, a potential attacker can no 
longer observe the FFs content but simply pass/fail information for the whole test vector. 
The general scheme of the proposed Secure Comparator is shown in Fig.2.11. Instead of directly shifting DUT’s responses 
(Sout)  out of the chip, the ATE also provides  the expected responses using the Sexp pin and the actual test response is  on-
chip compared with the expected one. After having compared all #SFF bits  captured in the scan-chain, the signal TestRes 
is asserted if the whole test vector matches the one with expected values. 
The Secure Comparator is composed of 3  parts: the Sticky Comparator responsible for the comparison between the bit 
stream coming from the scan chains and the expected values, and the Output Enabler triggering the final comparison result. 
Finally, the I/O Buffers allow keeping the test pin count as in a classic scan-based approach.
The Sticky Comparator performs a bitwise serial comparison between the bitstream coming from Sout and the one from 
Sexp.  A FF (Flag in the figure) is initially reset and then it rises to ‘1’ whenever one comparison fails. The reset of the flag is 
performed when the scan operation is  not enabled (i.e., Sen=’0’). This means then when the circuit goes from capture to 
test mode, the flag becomes meaningful and its value designates whether the two bitstream are equal or not.
The Output Enabler permits the observation of the TestRes only after comparing the whole test vector. It  is  composed of a 
down counter with parallel load that loads the value #SFF whenever the scan operation is not enabled. Therefore, when the 
circuit goes to test mode, it start counting and after #SFF clock cycles its terminal count allows outputting the TestRes 
signal through the AND gate. 
Secure 
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Fig. 2.11: Secure Comparator
The I/O Buffers  allow sharing the same pin for Sin and TestRes. A classical scan based design requires  3  signals: scan-in, 
scan-out and scan-enable. The proposed solution requires, besides Sin and Sen, the Sexp signal (that replaces Sout)  and 
the additional TestRes.  However,  Sin and TestRes are not used at the same time, therefore it is possible to use bi-
directional buffers  shared between them, as shown in Fig.2.11. During the shift operation the pin can be set as input and 
used by the tester to feed the circuit  with the input vectors,  whereas during the capture operation the pin is activated as 
output to deliver the previous comparison result. 
Concerning the area cost, on-chip comparison is necessary for sensitive scan chains only (the others can be treated in the 
usual way). However, while the Sticky Comparator is required for every scan chain,  all  sensitive chains can share the same 
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counter of the Output Enabler.  For a circuit with S scan chains, the longest one being composed of #SFFs, this Secure 
Comparator requires:
• S flip flops and 2·S logic gates (XOR+OR) for the Sticky Comparator; 
• 1 counter able to count from Log2(#SFFs) to 0, and S NAND gates to filter the TestRes signals; 
• 2·S buffers.
For example, a circuit with 32 scan chains of 10000 SFFs each, have an extra cost of 32 FFs, 98  combinational gates, 64 
buffers and one 14-bits counter. This overhead represents a negligible cost compared to the size of a circuit.
Concerning the security of the proposed scheme, the role of the proposed Secure Comparator is to avoid the observation of 
SFFs containing secret information.  If the result of the comparison was accessible at each clock cycle instead of each test 
vector, an attacker could easily observe the scan chain content by shifting in "000…000" on the Sexp pin. Each bit-
comparison would then validate that either the actual bit was ‘0’ when TestRes=1 and vice-versa. On the contrary, with the 
proposed vector-wise comparison the only way to retrieve the sensitive data information is  to apply a brute-force attack by 
trying every possible response until TestRes is asserted. This attack would thus require 2#SFF attempts. 
Concerning the testability of the circuit, The Secure Comparator does not impact the fault coverage. In fact, each test 
response is compared to the expected one as in a classical ATE-based test scheme. Therefore, the achievable fault 
coverage is not altered.  Test time is not increased either, since the expected responses are scanned-in at the same time as 
the next input vector is  scanned-in. A limitation of our technique is related to the presence of possible unpredictable values in 
the SFFs. Computing expected values for on-chip comparison is indeed no longer possible. To fix this limitation, the Sticky 
Comparator should ignore the comparison result (and keep unchanged its flag)  when Sout is unknown. This can be 
implemented by providing an additional mask signal that is asserted when needed. However, an attacker must not be able to 
mask as many bits as  wanted. In fact, if it were possible to mask all but one bit, it would be obvious to discover the value of 
each single bit in the scan response.  This  would reduce the complexity of the brute-force attack from exponential (O(2#SFF)) 
to linear (O(#SFF)). Therefore, the number of masked bit (per test vector) must be limited to P such that a brute force attack 
on 2#SFF-P remains unfeasible. The extra cost to tolerate unknown values includes an extra pin for the mask, a log2P counter 
to limit the number of masked bits and 2 logic gates. Fig. 2.12 shows a possible implementation.
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Fig. 2.12: Sticky Comparator with Masking
Limited observation of the scan chain content raises the question of whether fault diagnosis  is affected.  In a classical test 
scheme, the content of the whole scan chain after application of a test vector is  shifted-out to the ATE and analyzed to 
identify possible locations of the fault.  In the proposed scheme, since only pass/fail information is shifted-out, it is  not 
possible to differentiate which faults  cause a wrong response. However, in order to discriminate these cases,  it is actually 
possible to enter, for every test vector, the whole set of possible wrong expected responses that have been pre-calculated 
by resorting to the fault dictionary. Therefore, the proposed Secure Comparator allows the same diagnostic resolution as it 
can be obtained with the classical scan scheme. The only difference resides  in the matching procedure between the 
obtained responses and those stored in the fault dictionary. In the classic scheme this is  done off-line (i.e., after collecting all 
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responses from the circuit), while in our case all faulty responses must uploaded on the DUT thus  requiring additional time. 
Problems still exist in the case of debug. Indeed, in this  case, the fault response is not known in advance, thus limiting the 
proposed approach.
The results of these works have been published in the papers [J16], [S26], [P25] referenced in the Publication list.
Smart Test Controller
We have recently proposed a smart test controller that exploits the following observations:
• The scan-based test of digital circuits follows a predefined scheme: input vectors are shifted-in via the scan-in (with 
scan-en asserted), one functional clock cycle is  applied (also known as capture cycle, with scan-en not asserted), and 
output responses are shifted-out via scan-out (while, at the same time, the next input vector is shifted in).  When delay 
faults are targeted and the Launch-On-Capture technique is used, 2 capture cycles may be required.
• Known attacks are based on the fact that the circuit is first run in normal mode for a certain number of clock cycles in 
order to bring the circuit to a desired state (for instance in the AES, the circuit is  run up to the first encryption round). 
Then the scan chain is used to observe the state of the circuit in that moment.
The principle of the proposed controller relies on the masking of the scan-out signal in such a way that it does not deliver 
any sensitive data until the whole scan chain is first freshen. Fig. 2.13  sketches the Circuit Under Test (CUT) connected to 
the proposed smart test controller, while Fig.  2.13  details its finite state machine. The controller reads the scan-en signal 
and, based on its value, it forces to 0 the OUT_en signal that drives a 2-bit AND gate whose other input is the CUT’s  scan-
out.
CUT
S_en
S_in
S_outSecretKey
normal test
KNormal KTest
Smart Controller
OUT_en
MODES_en
S_en
S_in
S_out
Fig. 2.13: The Smart Controller within the original design
The controller is automatically armed at power-on (Normal state). Once it is armed, OUT_en is forced to 0 in order to filter 
any shift-out operations. In this initial  state, a down-counter is set to #L,  i.e., the number of scan flip-flops in CUT. After #L 
consecutive clock cycles  with scan-en asserted (Flushing state),  the controller is disarmed. During the Flushing state, the 
controller is still armed (OUT_en=0) to prevent the observation of the scan chain content after a normal execution (i.e.  scan 
attacks). After disarming the controller, OUT_en is set to 1 so that any scan operation is  performed without masking. The 
controller allows one or two capture cycles (Stuck-At-Capture and Delay-Capture states)  without re-arming OUT_en. If more 
than 2 capture cycles are executed, the controller goes back to the Normal state. The Shifting state allows shifting input 
vectors into the scan chain. The down-counter is  not used in this state because the sensible data already disappeared from 
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the scan chains. In this way,  the controller enables the test of the scan-chain itself where longer than #L sequences  are 
shifted without capture cycles. 
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Fig. 2.14: Finite State Machine of the Smart Controller 
The controller allows identifying two execution modes: normal and test (MODE signal). Nevertheless,  it does not require any 
additional signal to force one of the two modes since the detection of the mode is performed automatically: the Normal state 
is  the normal mode, while all the other states define the test mode. the controller automatically detects. The execution mode 
may be possibly used when two secret keys are used (as shown with dotted lines in Fig. 2.13). 
The security of secure devices using the proposed controlled is guaranteed by the fact that it  is not possible to bring the 
circuit in a desired state and then to shift out the content of the scan flip-flops. Indeed, the first time the scan chain is shifted 
out,  the scan-out signal is  forced to 0 for #L clock cycles. After this phase, the circuit can be fully tested. However, as soon 
as the attacker tried to run more than 2 functional clock cycles  (to possibly reach the desired state),  the controller would be 
armed again and the next scan-out operation would be masked.
This  controller can be inserted into the design at the very end of the design, thus not perturbing the overall design flow. It is 
also transparent to the tester because it does not modify the classical and standard test procedures. The area introduced by 
the controller is meaningless.
The results of this work have been published in the paper [S29] referenced in the Publication list.
Authentication-based Test Controller
This  work has been carried out within a cooperation between the LIRMM and the Catholic University of Leuven. We sought 
to provide security features to the IEEE 1149.1 JTAG interface by including a Schnorr-based secure test protocol, and to 
provide an efficient hardware implementation of the protocol using elliptic curve cryptography. This  is  the first work that 
proposes a mechanism for mutual authentication between the secure device and the tester based on a well known and 
studied public key authentication protocol. 
In this work, we solve the inherent key-management problem of existing Symmetric-Key Cryptography (SKC)  based secure 
JTAG approaches using Public-Key Cryptography (PKC). Specifically, if SKC is used for securing JTAG, there will be a 
common master secret key for all products or a large secret-key database needs to be maintained at the tester/updater 
side, which are not good options for mass  electronic products. PKC implementations are inherently more hardware 
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expensive and slower than SKC based approaches.  Therefore it is a challenging task to incorporate PKC in a resource 
constrained environment like JTAG.
The use of asymmetric primitives and the related public/private key pairs substantially improve the complexity involved in key 
management in this setting of tester against the device.  If we take for example the automobile industry, then we expect to 
bring our car to virtually any garage in the world and get our car serviced. Servicing cars now also includes updating 
software in one of the on-board units  (OBUs)  which may be through the JTAG interface. Currently these updates can be 
pushed to the OBU as soon as it is  powered on; no other security measures are used. One of most important reasons for 
the current lack of authentication is the fact that it presents car manufacturers  with a large key management problem that is 
inherent to the use of symmetric solutions in large scale systems.  In symmetric solutions, the verifier needs a copy of the 
same key that was also used to generate the authentication token (e.g., a message authentication code or MAC on the 
firmware). This implies that the use of a single master key is  very risky as it will be wide spread in many devices and likely to 
leak at one point in time. Therefore, symmetric key based solutions require unique keys to be installed at every verifier. In 
large scale systems, this would require a large database that link the identity of the prover to its  key and a means for verifiers 
to securely access and authenticate this service. Alternatively, key derivation schemes  could be used, but they only lower the 
risk related to a single master key. 
To overcome this problem, the solution proposed in this work offers the possibility of using certificates  instead of shared 
symmetric keys. This  would for example allow the use of the same signed firmware update for a wide range of OBUs, 
without the risk of installing the same symmetric key in this  range of devices. They just need a valid copy of the 
manufacturers’ public key for signature verification.
We use an enhanced version of ECC-based Schnorr Protocol as  the public-key cryptographic protocol in our secure JTAG 
test scheme. Various  public-key implementations,  such as RSA or ECC, may be used to solve the key-management 
problems present in previous secure JTAG approaches. We chose ECC as it offers the same security as RSA, with much 
smaller area footprint.  Area overhead is of critical importance,  since we are constrained in terms of silicon area required to 
incorporate security features into JTAG, owing to the small test interface available in most applications. Similarly, various 
protocols using ECC may been used. We chose the Schnorr protocol as it is provably secure and allows efficient 
implementation on space-constrained hardware.
An added positive side-effect of Schnorr is that it is “zero- knowledge” and thus no information about the secret key of the 
prover leaks during a protocol run. The zero-knowledge property may be useful in an uncontrolled in-the-field code update, 
debug or test environment where the communication channel between the test server and JTAG is untrusted and the secret 
need not be shared or linked to a communicating entity. 
Our proposed architecture is shown in Fig. 2.15. The ordinary JTAG circuitry is enclosed within dotted lines, and it is divided 
into its two main components: the TAP finite state machine and the instruction decoder. The Schnorr protocol is performed 
by the Schnorr controller, placed in the center of Fig. 2.15. It interacts with a modified JTAG instruction decoder, ECC 
module, and a 192-bit random number generator (a Linear Feedback Shift Register). The base point coordinates (curve 
parameters) are fetched from an external non-volatile memory.  The system is supposed to be locked in the beginning. In 
order to unlock it,  the tester must manipulate the JTAG inputs to enter the new ‘UNLOCK’ instruction. Then, the instruction 
decoder informs the Schnorr controller to start the protocol, by means of the ‘request_unlock’ signal.  As soon as the 
authenticity of the test server is verified, the Schnorr controller activates the ‘release_unlock’ signal, informing the instruction 
decoder that other instructions can now be performed. For instance, if the system is  unlocked, the design under test (DUT) 
boundary scan register can be controlled. Meanwhile,  when ‘release_unlock’ signal is not active, the instruction decoder sets 
the multiplexer ‘MUX1’ to always select the output from the multiplexer ‘MUX2’, which is controlled by the Schnorr controller, 
impeding the shift out of any DUT specific register.
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following Fermat’s little theorem. However, in affine coordi-
nates inversion is performed at every iteration of the point
multiplication algorithm. Thus, a dedicated inversion unit
based on extended Euclidian algorithm is implemented which
also helps efficient execution of ECDSA on our secure JTAG
scheme. Here we provide implementation details for both
designs which provide better design variations and the user
can opt for one of them in practice.
5 Secure JTAG Implementation
5.1 Integration of the ECC-processor with JTAG
An important contribution in our paper is the integration
of the ECC based Schnorr controller and ECC point
multiplier with the JTAG interface along with the other
modules. This has been done in a seamless manner so as
not to affect the timing aspects of the IEEE 1149.1 JTAG
standard, and also keeping the behavior of the TAP finite
state machine (illustrated in Appendix F) unchanged.
Our proposed architecture is shown in Fig. 1. The ordinary
JTAG circuitry is enclosed within dotted lines, and it is divided
into its two main components: the TAP finite state machine and
the instruction decoder. The Schnorr protocol (described in
Appendix A), as well as the ECDSA signature authentication
are performed by the Schnorr controller, placed in the center of
Fig. 1. It interacts with a modified JTAG instruction decoder,
ECCmodule, and a 192-bit random number generator (a Linear
Feedback Shift Register). The base point coordinates (curve
parameters) are fetched from an external non-volatile memory.
The system is supposed to be locked in the beginning. In
order to unlock it, the tester must manipulate the JTAG inputs to
enter the new ‘UNLOCK’ instruction. Then, the instruction
decoder informs the Schnorr controller to start the protocol, by
means of the ‘request_unlock’ signal. As soon as the authentic-
ity of the test server is verified, the Schnorr controller activates
the ‘release_unlock’ signal, informing the instruction decoder
that other instructions can now be performed. For instance, if the
system is unlocked, the design under test (DUT) boundary scan
register can be controlled. Meanwhile, when ‘release_unlock’
signal is not active, the instruction decoder sets the multiplexer
‘MUX1’ to always select the output from the multiplexer
‘MUX2’, which is controlled by the Schnorr controller, imped-
ing the shift out of any DUT specific register.
During the protocol execution, the communication with
test server consists of using the Schnorr shift registers
(192 bits) to shift in and out information required for the
protocol. For instance, the transmission of the intermediate
values, ‘Ta’ and ‘Tb’ (Protocol in Appendix A) is performed
by means of shifting out the value ‘Ta’ (or ‘Tb’) once the ECC
point multiplication is finished. It is important to notice that
the shifting is always controlled by the test server, and that the
timing for executing point multiplications depends on the
scalar multiplier. It means that the Schnorr controller must
inform the test server that it has finished each operation of the
protocol. This synchronization is achieved by always adding
one flip-flop at the end of the Schnorr shift register that is set
to’1’ if the information in the shift register is valid, otherwise
the multiplexer ‘MUX2’ selects the TDI input and the syn-
chronization flip-flop is set to ‘0’. Thus, the test server keeps
on shifting at least this one bit to detect that the Schnorr
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Fig. 2.15: JTAG-ECC Controller 
During the protocol execution, the communication with test server consists of using the Schnorr shift registers (192 bits)  to 
shift in and out information required for the protocol.  It is important to notice that the shifting is always controlled by the test 
server, and that the timing for executing point multiplications depends on the scalar multiplier. It means that the Schnorr 
controller must inform the test server that it has finished each operation of the protocol. This synchronization is  achieved by 
always adding one flip-flop at the end of the Schnorr shift register that is set to’1’ if the information in the shift register is 
valid, otherwise the multiplexer ‘MUX2’ selects the TDI input and the synchronization flip-flop is  set to ‘0’. Thus, the test 
server keeps on shifting at least this one bit to detect that the Schnorr controller is ready for receiving the next data. 
We made a detailed hardware implementations, area and timing results  for our ECC-based authentication protocol,  by 
showing that the whole circuit can be synthesized in less than 25K gates. 
The results of this work have been published in the paper [J15] referenced in the Publication list.
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3.7. Fault Attacks
Fault-based attacks rely on perturbation of the circuit and use (expected)  production of erroneous results for inferring secret 
information. Formally,  the faults reflect the physical conditions that cause a circuit to fail to perform in a required manner. The 
error is the visible aspect of the fault, i.e. a wrong observable signal produced by the defective device.  The fault set induced 
by fault-based attacks includes transient faults on combinational gates, and bit-flips on memory elements.
Several techniques can be used for fault injection. They rely either on perturbation of the environmental conditions (e.g. 
power supply, clock), or, for higher cost and better precision, on injection of transients or bit-flips on target signals (e.g. faults 
injected through laser beams).
There are two forms of countermeasures against fault-based attacks: sensor-based and error-detection-based 
countermeasures. The former ones aim at detecting inappropriate environmental conditions  (for instance, unexpected light, 
clock glitches, or additional current in the substrate of the CMOS device). The second is based on the use of information 
redundancy to detect the presence of errors. 
In the last 5 years we actively worked on the proposition of new error detection methods for fault attacks,  both sensor-based 
(by integrating built-in current sensors) and error-detection-based. Moreover,  we have developed a fault simulator tool that is 
able to simulate the effect of a laser injection in a CMOS device and to perform the simulation of the whole circuit. The 
simulation has been used to validate the effectiveness of the proposed countermeasures. The next subsections will describe 
the sensor-based countermeasure, the error-detection-based countermeasures, and finally some highlight on the fault 
simulator.
3.7.1. Sensor-based Countermeasure
Built-in current sensors  (BICS) were initially proposed as a mechanism for detecting large increases in the current IDDQ 
consumed by a CMOS circuit during its quiescent state, i.e.  when the circuit is not switching. Further,  BICS were also 
adapted for detecting transient faults in memory cells.  Recently,  efforts were made for monitoring transient faults  in 
combinational logic as  well for security purposes. The principle of a BICS is to monitor the current between the power lines 
(VDD and GND) in order to distinguish anomalous transient currents from normal currents. The today’s  problem is that the 
amplitude of transient currents induced by radiation effects or fault attacks can have the same order of currents normally 
generated by switching activities in combinational logic circuits.   Hence,  schemes monitoring power lines are very limited for 
detecting just small range of transient faults.
On the other hand, BICS connected to the bulks of the monitored circuit’s transistors  are able to detect a wider range of 
transient faults. We have proposed a Bulk-BICS (BBICS) circuit that allows detecting the presence of suspicious current in 
the bulk of the circuit. Moreover,  since this circuit increases the overall power consumption, we have introduced a sleep-
mode. Fig. 2.16 sketches the architecture of the proposed BBICS. The BBICS is designed for monitoring NMOS bulks in 
pull-down networks (BBICS for PMOS transistors  is not described here). Wmin represents the minimum diffusion width of 
the transistors of a 32-nm CMOS technology, Lmin is  the minimum channel length, and the design factors X and Y are used 
for calibrating the sensors, as discussed later.
The BBICS is mainly composed of a latch (transistors 5, 6,  7, and 8)  that are responsible for amplifying the anomalous 
transient currents coming from the bulk “NMOS_Bulk” of the monitored block. Higher gain of amplification is obtained by 
increasing X and Y, hence higher BBICS’s sensitivity in detecting transient faults is  also determined in terms of these design 
factors.  BBICS’s latch has, moreover, the function of memorizing a flag in case of a transient fault within a defined current 
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range. On the other hand, as soon as the flag of fault is processed by higher instances of the system, BBICS’s latch must be 
reset (through the input “Reset”) in order to detect other transient faults.
By growing the factor X, transistors 6 and 8  allow improving the BBICS’s  sensitivity in detecting transient faults. However, it 
also contributes  considerably to the increase of static power consumption, which is today responsible for up to 50% of the 
power dissipation of systems based on ultra-deep submicron technologies. In fact, if higher BBICS’s sensitivity is the goal, 
greater X and amplification have to be designed to increase the diffusion widths of transistors 6 and 8,  and then decreasing 
their vth. These lower vth make thus possible to switch “Flag_N” (from GND to VDD level)  with lower amplitudes of anomalous 
transient currents (i.e. transient faults of smaller charges that flow from “NMOS_bulk” through transistor 2 up to node 
“Flag_N”). 
To reduce static power consumption we introduced transistor 9  that allows the utilization of a sleep-mode when the system 
is  left on standby. Transistor 9  is, in this case, set “on”, making a less resistive path between the node “NMOS_bulk” and 
GND. Consequently,  Vgs of transistors 6  and 8  approach to zero, Isub becomes much lower, and thus the static power 
consumption is drastically reduced. 
Fig. 2.16: The proposed NMOS sleep-mode improved BBICS
Transistor-level simulations allowed comparing our Sleep-mode Improved BBICS with state-of.the-art solutions, showing its 
effectiveness in terms of both detectability of transient current pulses and low power consumption.
This  work is  now part of a collaborative project between the LIRMM, the ENMSE (Gardanne)  and the TIMA lab. The goal is to 
actually produce a CMOS circuit implementing this sensor.
The results of this work have been published in the papers  [J14],  [J11],  [P33], [W18], [S28], [P24], [S24],  [C11] referenced in 
the Publication list.
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3.7.2. Error-detection-based countermeasures
Error detection codes consist in checking for possible mismatch between a code predicted for an output from the current 
input, and the code of the actual output of the process. Code prediction is performed in parallel with the main process 
(algorithm, round, operation) in such a way that predicted and actual codes can be compared at the end.
In one of our first works, we proposed a solution that focuses on S-boxes of the AES. The principle is to add two parity bits 
per S-box, one parity bit for the input byte and one for the output byte, and therefore the logic for predicting such 
information (see Figure 2.17). The actual output parity is  compared with the predicted output parity bit, and the actual input 
parity bit is compared to the predicted one. When the S-box and the prediction circuits are synthesized as combinational 
logic, the area overhead is  38.33%  with respect to the original S-box. This  solution allows detecting an additional 27% of 
errors of even multiplicity, besides all odd multiplicity of errors. By combining the double parity with solutions that allow 
protecting the whole AES round, we proposed a couple of architectures that are described in [B2].
Fig. 2.17: Double Parity bit for the Sbox
We also carried out a major contribution in the domain by deeply analyzing the effect of the fault in the circuit and the 
strength of the detection code. Indeed, a detection code may be very strong to detect a particular set of error, while the fault 
induced by the attack generates a totally different error. We conducted extensive experiments in order to show the error 
profiles resulting from the injection of a single transient bit-flip fault (representative of faults  injected by means of a laser 
beam), and the real effect (i.e.,  the error)  at the output monitored by the detection mechanism. This information can be used 
for choosing the appropriate code-based detection scheme. This  study showed how a different design and synthesis  style 
can have big impacts on the behavior of the circuit under attack. [B1] and [B2] report the detailed results.
The results of this work have been published in the papers [B1], [B2], [S21], [S20], [W10] referenced in the Publication list.
3.7.3. Fault Simulator
In order to validate countermeasures  against fault attacks, we developed a fault simulator that we called LIFTING (LIRMM 
Fault Simulator). It allows  performing 0-delay and delay-annotated fault simulation for single/multiple stuck-at faults, Single/
multiple Event Upset (SEU) and single/multiple event transient (SET) on digital circuits described in Verilog. Moreover,  it 
Chapter II: Details
Habilitation à Diriger les Recherches - Giorgio Di Natale
 49
allows integrating faults that are described at spice level, by performing multi-level  simulations. LIFTING is an open-source 
project.
The proposed tool is implemented to operate on a set of tables that model the circuit.  For each circuit node (logic gate), the 
table has an entry for the logic state (0, 1, X, Z) and, for each output of the gate, the list of input gates that are driven by this 
output gate.  An event is said to have occurred when a signal changes  state, and then is managed. The tool is  described 
using C++, an object-oriented programming language. Each node of the circuit is modeled using a class. 
The motivation of an in-house tool for simulation is related to the need of deeply understanding how the circuit reacts  when a 
fault is injected. Standard commercial tools are usually optimized to reduce the execution time and they do not allow 
exploring all scenari required to really understand what is going on within the circuit. 
For this same reason, the tool is now used for didactical purposes at the University of Montpellier and the ETS of Montréal 
(Canada). Moreover, ST Microelectronics is running some tests on the tool for evaluation.
The results  of this  work have been published in the papers  [P13], [S17], [P17], [P27], [P32], [W17], [C13] referenced in the 
Publication list.
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3.8. Test of 3D-Stacked Integrated Circuits
The stacking process of integrated circuits  using TSVs  (Through Silicon Via) is  a promising technology that keeps the 
development of the integration more than Moore’s law, where TSVs enable to tightly integrate various dies in a 3D fashion. 
We started studying this topic in 2011 to address the new challenges related to the test of 3D-SIC (Stacked Integrated 
Circuits). The main challenges  come from the novel levels of the fabrication process and the need for testing the circuits at 
the different phases (pre-,  mid-, and post-bond tests). Pre-bond test targets the individual dies  at wafer level, by testing not 
only classical logic (digital logic, IOs, RAM, etc,)  but also unbounded TSVs. Mid-bond test targets the test of partially 
assembled 3D stacks, whereas finally post-bond test targets the final circuit. It is generally admitted that a 3D test flow 
should involve test procedures at all stacking levels of the 3D components including specific procedures  for pre-bond TSV 
testing in order to provide Known Good Die before stacking.
We addressed two main problems. From one side, pre-bond testing of TSVs  is a real issue due to the difficulty to get direct 
access to TSVs, which are not connected yet, using fine probe heads.  So specific Design-for-Test structures for TSVs 
should allow to anticipate controllability and observability bottlenecks. From the other side, the classical Test Access 
Mechanisms implemented in current standards must be revised to follow the new production flow. Indeed, the test of a die 
requires dedicated I/O pad to bring test stimuli and to observe test responses.  However, once the die is stacked to another 
die,  the dedicated I/O pads  are no longer available (because they are physically covered by the other die). Therefore, new 
Test Access  Mechanisms must be defined in order to re-route test data from different input sources, to different output 
signals.
The next two sections focus on the recent works we carried out in the last two years. In particular, we have developed a 
solution for pre-bond test of TSV and we elaborated some new ideas to extend an on-going IEEE standard (IEEE P1687, 
IJTAG) to 3D-SIC circuits. This work is conducted in cooperation with the CEA-Leti (Grenoble).
3.8.1. 3D IC BIST for pre-bond test of TSVs
The underlying idea is that an unbound TSV can be electrically modeled by a RC network, whose main contribution is given 
by the capacitance connected to ground, as shown in Figure 2.18.
Fig. 2.18: TSV modeling
The main assumption in detecting defective TSVs is that a possible defect (pinhole, micro-void or broken TSV) would affect 
the delay of the RC network. By measuring this delay it would be possible to distinguish between good and faulty TSVs. 
We have proposed a Built-In Self-Test architecture that allows measuring the dischargee time of the RC network. Fig.  2.19 
gives  an overview of the proposed BIST implementation for testing one TSV. The TSV Test Circuit is used to charge/
discharge and to sense the voltage level at the TSV top end. The Control signal monitors the different test phases. A Flip 
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Flop (FF) is used to store the OutSensing signal at the TSV Test Circuit output and delivers the TSV Test Result.  Conversely 
to related works, the proposed DfT circuitry also includes a Delay Circuit that generates the sampling signal Clk  used to store 
the test result of the TUT after an expected delay. Clk is slaved to the Control command.
Fig. 2.19: Block Diagram of the Proposed BIST TSV Pre-Bond Test Scheme
Details  of the TSV Test Circuit is given in Fig. 2.20. The TSV is  represented here by a global model according to fault models 
presented in Fig. 2.18. A fault-free TSV is  such that Rvoid=0, Rpin-hole = ∞ and the TSV equivalent capacitance is defined 
as dC+(1-d)C=C. Transmission gates are used to connect the TSV to the test circuitry or to the logic used in mission mode.
Fig. 2.20: BIST scheme for TSV Pre-Bond testing
The PMOS transistor of the inverter connected to the TSV top end is  used to pre-charge the TSV to VDD when Control = 0. 
The TSV can also be discharged through the NMOS transistor by switching Control to 1. The two inverters  on the right-hand 
side are used for TSV voltage sensing. After the pre-charge phase, the voltage level at the TSV top should be high enough to 
switch these two inverters and generate a logic ‘1’ on the OutSensing signal. After discharge, OutSensing should be equal 
to ‘0’. Charge and discharge times depend on the capacitance of the TUT and on possible extra serial resistance or leakage 
to the substrate.
The test procedure consists in charging the TSV and then to discharge it while sampling the voltage level just before that 
OutSensing falls to ‘0’  due to the TSV discharge. The BIST circuitry should capture the logic value ‘1’ in the FF for a fault-free 
TSV. In case of fault the discharge occurs sooner, OutSensing falls to 0 before the expected time and the BIST circuitry 
should capture ‘0’ (fail) instead of ‘1’ (pass).
Experimental simulation results  shown that for small local variability (that is usual the case for even new technologies under 
45nm), the measure of the discharge time is not sensitive to PVT variations, thus leading to a robust mechanism.
The results of this work have been published in the papers [C14], [S30], [P33], [P31], [C12] referenced in the Publication list.
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3.9. Reliability of Microprocessor-based Systems
3.9.1. Watchdog for Reliability
VLSI and microprocessors performances have increased by more than five orders  of magnitude in the last three decades, 
made possible by continued technology scaling. This trend will probably continue in then next years  providing an integration 
capacity of billion of transistors.  As technology scales further we will face new challenges, such as variability, single event 
upset (soft errors),  and device degradation. All these effects manifest as inherent unreliability of the components posing 
design and test challenges.
I proposed an instruction checking methodology aiming at identifying the correct execution of each instruction on a 
microprocessor-based system during its normal behavior. The overall idea is to monitor a set of control signals  of the target 
microprocessor identifying erroneous sequences of activations. The approach is  able to identify both transient and 
permanent errors in the internal logic of a microprocessor that modify the activation sequence of the monitored signals.
Of particular interest of this work is  the design of an algorithm able to identify the minimum set of signals to observe in order 
to obtain the required level of fault detection.
The main idea relies on the definition of an external hardware module (ICM: Instruction Checking Module) trying to 
understand if the currently executed instruction is exactly the one fetched from the system bus by observing a set of signals 
coming from the microprocessor.
Each instruction fetched by the microprocessor is also fetched by the ICM. The ICM observes a set of control and status 
signals coming from the microprocessor.  Those signals can be either taken from the boundary or from the interior of the 
microprocessor when possible. By observing the waveforms produced by each executed instruction on the monitored 
signals and by comparing those waveforms with a set of pre-calculated ones obtained by simulation, the ICM is able to 
check the correct execution of the instruction.
The results of the work have been published in the paper [S17], referenced in the Publication list. 
3.9.2. Evaluation of the Reliability of Microprocessor-based Systems
AS microprocessor technology scales down to the very deep sub-micron range, high production variability, voltage scaling 
and high operating frequency increase the hardware susceptibility to (soft) errors. This has  a negative impact on the reliability 
of a wide range of computer-based applications which are critical to our health, safety and financial security. Since 1996 
several studies reported cases of large computer system failures caused by cosmic-ray-induced soft-errors.
Several techniques have been proposed to protect digital  circuits against soft-errors, e.g., radiation-hardened technologies, 
error detection/correction codes and redundant architectures. Software Implemented Hardware Fault Tolerance (SIHFT) also 
gained attention in the last decade. These techniques have a negative impact on systems’ performance, power 
consumption, area and design complexity. Their application must therefore be carefully evaluated depending on the soft-
error rate of the target system.
Unfortunately,  tools and techniques to estimate the susceptibility of a computer system to soft-errors, taking into account 
both the hardware and the software domain, are not readily available or fully understood. The execution of a program may 
mask a large amount of soft-errors. In fact, at the system level soft-errors do not matter as long as  the final outcome of the 
program is correct. To efficiently trade-off between fault tolerance cost and system reliability one has to ask: what is the 
probability of a program P to have a correct execution state given a certain hardware (raw) soft-error rate? Fault injection is a 
viable solution to answer this question. However, it can be very expensive and time consuming.
We have proposed a new methodology to estimate computer-based systems reliability against soft-errors. The target 
microprocessor is  first characterized to profile the probability of successful  execution of each instruction of its  Instruction Set 
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Architecture (ISA). A static and very fast analysis of the control and data flow of the executed software is  then performed to 
compute its probability of successful execution in case of soft-errors. The presented method has the potential to help 
engineers to choose the best hardware and software architecture to minimize the impact of soft-errors on the system’s 
reliability.
In the context of this work, estimating the failure probability of a computer system running a program P means estimating the 
probability of observing an error in the outcome of the program (assumed bugs-free) running on a hardware system affected 
by soft-errors  only. Soft-errors in the hardware may be masked either because they affect idle resources,  or because the 
program’s execution somehow overwrites the error. Based on this assumption, this  section introduces an analytical model to 
estimate the probability of success of a program in presence of soft-errors in the hardware.
Programs are analyzed using the concept of program traces. A program trace is an ordered sequence of k  instructions (k-
tuple)  executed while running a program. Two approaches  can be followed to obtain a relevant set of traces for the 
proposed reliability estimation model. Whenever a strong, statistically relevant set of inputs for the target software is 
available, it can be exploited to derive a corresponding set of traces. Several runs of the program are executed, each with a 
different input, and run-time information about executed instructions and accessed data are recorded to compose each 
trace.  The probability assigned to each trace can be uniformly distributed or calculated based on the knowledge of the 
probability of occurrence of the corresponding inputs. However, in several situations in which very early design exploration is 
performed, a statistically relevant set of inputs  might not be available,  or it might be difficult to estimate how much it covers 
the set of possible executions. For these situations, we proposed an algorithm that generates a set of traces by performing a 
static analysis of the program’s binary code. The goal of the proposed algorithm is to cover as many parts as possible of the 
control-flow graph of the application, providing also a metric to measure how many of the possible paths  have been 
covered.
In this  algorithm, fault injection is  used only once for a one-time, reusable, characterization of the microprocessor in terms of 
probability of success of each of its  instructions in the presence of a soft-error in the hardware. The overall reliability of the 
microprocessor running a given workload is  then computed with a purely probabilistic approach.  The same characterization 
can then be reused every time the same CPU is used to build a new system or a new application software needs to be 
evaluated. The proposed method makes it possible to perform early exploration of design alternatives  giving the possibility of 
comparing the system reliability using different processor architectures, even before the actual system’s design is available. 
We showed that the proposed method is extremely efficient with a high resolution. The results of the work have been 
published in the paper [J10].
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4. Students
4.1. Master students
• Alessandro Dispenza (2001): A logic fault simulator implemented as self modifying code 
• Ivano Solcia, Elisabetta Iorio (2002): A web-based tool for peer-reviews 
• Fabrizio Micheletti (2002): Delay Fault Testing: a comparison among available tools and methods
• Claudio Marvaldi (2002): Circuit to automatically generate FPGAs’ bitstreams for test purposes
• Alberto Bosio, Francesco Ciartiano, Ivano Picco (2003): SJAM Memory Test Pattern Generator
• Vincenzo Santoro, Francesco Sorace (2003): Code analysis methodology to characterize the termination probability of an 
application affected by a SEU in the binary code
• Andrea Bardone, Elisabetta Corsi (2003): An environment for fault injection based on a ethernet router in Linux
• Stefano Palazzo (2004): an ATPG for balancing the power consumption during the burn-in test
• Jean Paul Piccato (2004): Control Flow checking to protect microprocessors against radiations
• Paolo Pellegrino (2004): A watchdog process to increase the reliability of computer systems 
• Gianfranco Panico, Piero Bellomo (2005): Self-Repair of FIR Filters
• G. Vezza (2006): Trusted Flow to protect against soft errors 
• Bottigliero Davide, Magazzù Donato, Roviora Samuele (2006): Development of a e-learning platform (in cooperation with 
the UniNettuno university in Rome)
• Ignazio Cumbo (2006): Experimental modeling of ballistic applications via Finite State Machines
• Ana Agudo (2006): Audio/Visual remote systems using RTP protocol
• Ahmed El Boujouf (2008): A masking approach to protect AES against DPA
• Khalid Jettioui (2008): Identification of optimal input sequences for DPA
• Jihan Rezwan (2008): A fast approach for the identification of correlation between power and data
• Vincent Gregot (2008): Study and implementation of an attack platform for DPA
• Driss Aboulkassimi (2009): Validation of an optimization method for DPA attacks
• Miro Valka (Post-Master, 2010): Development of a tool for enhancing the resolution of the DPA
• Liang Shao (2011): Testing identical dies in 3D stacked Integrated Circuits
• Chloé Desdouits (2012): Implementation of an optimal algorithm for Wafer to Wafer matching
• Artem Marisov (2013): Implementation of a TMR scheme at flip-flop level
Chapter II: Details
Habilitation à Diriger les Recherches - Giorgio Di Natale
 55
4.2. PhD Students
Table 4.1 summarizes the PhD students I co-directed, along with the period of the thesis and the percentage of supervision.
PhD Student Years %
Luca Tagliaferri 2003-05 10%
Alberto Bosio 2003-06 20%
Clara Tibaldi 2003-06 10%
Alessandro Savino 2005-07 10%
Marion Doulcier 2007-08 10%
Kaouthar Bousselam 2008-12 30%
Jean Da Rolt 2009-12 30%
Feng Lu 2011- 40%
Yassine Fkih 2011- 25%
Stephan De Castro 2012- 25%
Papa Sidy Ba 2013- 25%
Maha Kooli 2013- 70%
Overall 305%
Table 4.1: Summary of the PhD Students
Luca Tagliaferri - “Source code modifications for on-line error handling”
The thesis is about a source to source compiler that is fed with C/C++ code and produces as output functionally equivalent 
to the one in input but enriched with routines and redundant code abler to detect errors injected within the program memory. 
The program itself was written with Microsoft Foundation Classes and the library engine was written partly in C and partly in 
C++.
The research aims at finding the possibility to realize software able to detect and possibly correct faults occurred during 
program execution and caused by external unauthorized agents. During the research many fault tolerant tools,  library as well 
as a fault injection environments have been developed.
Alberto Bosio - Dependable Architectures for Safety-Critical Applications
Any new semiconductor technology provides further miniaturization and higher performances, increasing the number of 
advanced functions  that electronic products can offer.  Microcomputers  are increasingly being used in applications where 
their correct operations are vital to ensure the safety of both people and the environment. These “safety-critical applications” 
include,  among the other, anti-lock braking systems in automobiles, fly-by-wire aircrafts, shut-down systems in nuclear 
power plants. It is, therefore, vital that engineers be aware of the safety implications of the systems they develop.
There is a clear trend to integrate large quantities of memories on a chip. Memories are designed with aggressive design 
rules and tend to be more prone to manufacturing defects. Memories in complex SoC are deeply embedded in the circuits 
and are not easily accessible from the chip pin to apply test program. New IP Infrastructures to embed the test programs 
and to allow diagnosis and debug operation are required. 
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Furthermore, the increasing scale of integration and the introduction of new manufacturing processes introduce new classes 
of defects  not present in the previous technologies. To efficiently deal with them, the process of memory test program 
generation should be automated to a maximum extent. This  goal involves the realization of algorithms able to address the 
problem of:  (i) describing new fault models (ii)  generating tests able to cover these new fault models, (iii)  verifying the 
effectiveness of the generated test programs.
This  work leads to implement two methodologies to increase system dependability,  tackling memory and processor testing, 
respectively, and a Fault injection environment used to evaluate the system dependability. In particular, a MArch Test 
automatic generator Engine (MaTE) has been developed. It can generate non-redundant March algorithm from user-defined 
fault lists. The generated test algorithm can be used in every test strategies, such as end-of-production test, BIST or On-line-
test. Automatically generated test algorithms proved to be able to reduce the total amount of test time of more than 16% 
w.r.t. previously state-of-the-art techniques. Moreover, a functional test strategy for a generic microprocessor has then been 
designed;  to prove the efficiency of the methodology a completely test suite procedures for the Motorola PowerPC 603  core 
has been implemented.
Clara Tibaldi: Test Access Methods for System-On-Chip
Progress in the System-on-a-Chip (SoC) technology and reuse methodologies have allowed integration of component from 
different sources into a single chip. For a SoC design consisting of multiple large cores, these core tests constitute a large 
part of the overall IC test. The emerging IEEE P1500 standard addresses the specific challenges that come with testing 
deeply embedded reusable cores supplied by diverse providers, who often use different hardware description levels and 
mixed technologies.
The work focused on the formal verification of core-wrapper P1500-Compliance with the purpose to assure that the 
component can be successfully integrated in a SoC.  In addition, the P1500 Compliance Checking Environment (P1500 CCE) 
can assist the core suppliers  in providing a CTL description of the core, create the CTL description of a P1500-Compliant 
wrapper for the unwrapped core, synthesize the relative VHDL wrapper, and suit the core test patterns for the wrapper.
Alessandro Savino: Software-based Self-Test of Microprocessor
System-On-Chip technology trends are so advanced that in a single chip one can embed different core, having different 
functionality, making possible the definition of the Intellectual Properties, such as  microprocessor, memories  and other 
peripherals.  Microprocessor core testing becomes a very difficult task, due to the high complexity of internal architecture, 
moreover nature of an embedded core makes impracticable resort to classic external test mechanisms such Automatic Test 
Equipments. Rising of Built In Self Test (BIST)  overcomes this problem porting the test mechanism and patterns inside the 
core. BIST solution usually requires to stop the core functionality in order to perform the test. However, critical applications 
require an on-line test executed in working condition (it means that the component is placed inside the environment where it 
will work since its  lifetime).  On-line test nature suggests the typical preferred approach: Software-Based Self-Test (SBST), 
where test patterns are the microprocessor instructions, provided by the Instruction Set Architecture.
The PhD thesis studied and investigates novel microprocessor test generation methodologies.
Marion Doulcier: Self-Test of Secure Devices
At the core of an electronic device offering digital security services is the cryptographic coprocessor that executes the 
cryptographic function. Such crypto-cores provide security services such as confidentiality, integrity,  and authentication. The 
work developed during the PhD thesis aimed at providing efficient test solutions for possible physical failures on the 
electronic device implementing the cryptographic algorithm. Most of the work focused on the exploration of autonomous 
Built-In Self-Test techniques where the input test patterns were self generated by the secure circuit itself. 
In classical BIST solutions for generic digital  logic, storage elements are organized into scan chains and additional hardware 
is  used for feeding the scan chains with pseudorandom test data, and sinking the test responses before analysis of the 
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compressed signature.  However, additional logic for BIST implementation can costly its (in terms of fault coverage and test 
length)  can be not optimal. The thesis work demonstrated the efficiency of the autonomous generation of input sequences 
and the intrinsic collection of output responses.
Kaouthar Bousselam - Countermeasures against fault attacks in cryptographic circuits
To ensure confidentiality and secure data exchanges, secure circuits use cryptographic certified algorithms. Despite this, the 
attackers have not stopped looking for possible ways in order to retrieve the secret data processed by these circuits. One 
powerful  method is  to inject a fault in the circuit during normal operation. This fault will produce an incorrect result at the 
output of the circuit. Comparing correct result (i.e., without fault injection)and wrong result (i.e., with fault injection), the 
attacker can extract information about the secret data processed by the circuit. 
The aim of Kaouthar’s thesis has been to improve the strength and reliability of security against attacks at fault circuits. To 
achieve this  goal,  she worked on the online detection of errors  by using advanced error detection codes. Moreover, rather 
than detect all kinds of errors, she focused on the detection of realistic errors that may be produced by such attacks. She 
defined a fault model and, based on that fault model, she found the best error detection codes that cover errors generated 
by those faults.
I was a member of her thesis defense jury.
Jean Da Rolt - Testability vs. Security: New Scan-Based Attacks & Countermeasures
Jean firstly analyze the vulnerabilities induced by test infrastructures onto embedded secrecy in digital integrated circuits 
dedicated to cryptography. Then he proposed new scan-based attacks and effective countermeasures. Scan chains 
insertion is the most used technique to ensure the testability of digital cores, providing high fault  coverage. However,  for ICs 
dealing with secret information, scan chains can be used as back doors  for accessing secret data, thus becoming a threat 
to device’s security. We start by describing a series of new attacks that exploit information leakage out of advanced Design- 
for-Testability structures such as response compaction, X-Masking and partial scan. Conversely to some previous works that 
proposed that these structures are immune to scan-based attacks, we show that our new attacks can reveal secret 
information that is  embedded inside the chip boundaries. Regarding the countermeasures, he proposed three new solutions. 
The first one moves the comparison between test responses and expected responses from the Automatic Test Equipment to 
the chip. This solution has a negligible area overhead, no effect on fault coverage. The second countermeasure aims to 
protect the circuit against unauthorized access,  for instance to the test mode,  and also ensure the authentication of the 
circuit. For that purpose, mutual-authentication using Schnorr protocol on Elliptic Curves is implemented. As the last 
countermeasure, he proposed that Differential Analysis Attacks algorithm-level countermeasures, such as point-blinding and 
scalar-blinding can be reused to protect the circuit against scan-based attacks.
I was a member of his thesis defense jury.
Feng Lu - Transient Fault Simulation of Secure Devices
Secure devices (i.e. devices implementing cryptographic functions and/or storing secret information)  are designed with the 
ability to protect information against unauthorized access and intentional misuse. For that,  they implement state-of-the-art 
cryptographic algorithm that have proved to be resistant against cryptanalysis. 
Unfortunately,  when the algorithm is implemented in a hardware device, other types of attacks  are possible. Among all  the 
type of attacks targeting the hardware (also known as Side-Channel Attacks), one of the most efficient is the one based on 
the intentional injection of faults within the circuit.   This type of attack, called "Differential  Fault Analysis" (DFA), consists in 
inferring the secret data by comparing the results of a faulty and a fault-free encryption.
The first goal of this thesis  is to understand and to model the behavior of a real fault injection on the circuit. After 
understanding the type of faults that can be injected on a circuit,  the second goal of the thesis  is to develop a transient fault 
simulator able to reproduce the behavior of a circuit under attack. The simulator, that is under development, is able to deal 
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with gate-level netlist  with timing information of each port, and it can consider its layout (i.e. the topological information of 
each gate within the circuit).
Yassine Fkih - Test of 3D Stacked Integrated Circuits
TSV-based 3-Dimensional (3D)  integrated circuit is an emerging integration technology where multiple layers of planar 
devices (dies) are stacked and interconnected using so called Through Silicon Vias (TSVs). Multiple dies are stacked 
vertically, significantly increasing on-chip device count thus extending Moore’s Law. Besides footprint advantages, the 
potential benefits of 3D integration can include higher device speed, smaller overall cost, lower power consumption, larger 
bandwidth, and it will allows heterogeneous designs. 
Unfortunately,  3D die stacking also presents new challenges. Among them, test and testability is a chief challenge. In 
particular, new defects can appear during the bonding process (defects that are not modeled for single-die technology), fault 
models in TSV are not yet fully modeled, test strategy (i.e., pre-, mid-, and post-bond test) must be specifically defined to 
cope with this fabrication process, and test access mechanism become more complex due to the limit access the inter-dies.
The main objective of this  PhD thesis is the study of the specific issues related to the 3D integration technology that impact 
the test and the testability of the whole system. The work is covering the following aspects: to develop different test 
strategies according to the available test resources  and the assembly process; to understand and define the best test 
strategy (i.e., which fault must be tested at which test step) to allow the best trade-off between yield and test cost; to 
analyze the issues arising from limited test access to the components of the 3D circuit w.r.t current definition of new 
standards.
Stephan De Castro - Laser-Induced fault Effects in Security-dedicated circuit
Modeling and Simulation of Laser Attacks against secure circuits Secure devices  (i.e. devices implementing cryptographic 
functions and/or storing secret information)  are designed with the ability to protect information against unauthorized access 
and intentional misuse. For that, they implement state-of-the-art cryptographic algorithm that have proved to be resistant 
against cryptanalysis. Unfortunately, when the algorithm is implemented in a hardware device, other types  of attacks  are 
possible. Among all the type of attacks  targeting the hardware (also known as  Side-Channel Attacks),  one of the most 
efficient is the one based on the intentional injection of faults  within the circuit. This type of attack, called "Differential Fault 
Analysis" (DFA), consists in inferring the secret data by comparing the results of a faulty and a fault-free encryption. 
The first goal of his thesis is to understand and to model the behavior of a real fault injection on the circuit. Stephan is 
currently study the effect of real experiments performed by using laser attacks on both the backside and the frontside of the 
integrated circuit. After understanding the type of faults  that can be injected on a circuit and after having developed 
comprehensive fault models exploitable at logic level, the second goal of the thesis is  to integrate the faults into the simulator 
under development in our group.
Papa Sidy Ba - Hardware Trojan Detection
The vulnerabilities  in today’s design and fabrication process have raised the possibility of malicious circuit insertion into an 
integrated circuit to impact its  functionality or transmit secret key information to the adversary. Such malicious circuits are 
known as Hardware Trojans Horses. Hardware Trojan detection problem has gained significant attention over the past few 
years and is becoming a major concern specifically for secure devices. 
Among others, one way to guarantee the absence of such trojans is  defined Trojan models that can be represented as 
additional gates in the circuit,  and to generate test patterns targeting those additional gates. The goals of this thesis  are, first 
to propose innovative methods to identify possible locations  of the Hardware Trojans, and then to provide solutions for 
generating suitable test vectors able to detect them.
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Maha Kooli
Information technology is  at the core of our society and it relies  completely on the design of electronic information processing 
systems. Today’s  computing is a true continuum that ranges from smart-phones  to mission-critical datacenter machines, 
and from desktops to automobiles. Therefore,  reliability of electronic systems becomes a key challenge for the whole 
information and communication technology and must be guaranteed without penalizing or slowing down the characteristics 
of the final products.
In this  context, the FP7 project CLERECO aims at addressing the problem of having an early,  fast,  and accurate evaluation of 
computing systems reliability to support design decisions for hardware and software reliability enhancing mechanisms in the 
system. Such solutions can be only developed if the expected reliability of the system can be quickly and accurately 
assessed: (a) at different stages of the design flow (from design concept and early design stages through first silicon 
validation and eventually during operation in the field),  (b) considering the impact of all hardware and software components, 
and the different modes of operation (use cases) of the system. Finally, the development of a reliable and dependable 
product that employs mechanisms to detect and handle possible faults can reduce the overall life cycle costs.
The goals of the work that will be performed by the PhD student are: to analyze the reliability of the different hardware and 
software components at different levels of detail (depending on the design phase), emphasizing the role that the interaction 
between hardware and software plays in the overall reliability figure of the system; to validate the reliability of the system via a 
flexible, fast, and accurate evaluation framework; to comprehensively support the reliability decision-making process in 
computing systems with a reliability evaluation framework (methodology and tools)  that leads to just the right reliability for the 
system.
4.3. PostDoc Students
Rodrigo Possamai Bastos
The semiconductor industry is one of the enablers of new businesses. General usage of products such as mobile phones, 
and GPS navigation are only made possible by the constant cost-down of the manufacturing of a single transistor as well as 
the integration of digital,  analogue and RF blocks in a single package. This cost down trend will continue. This  provides 
opportunities for new products such as car radars that will  improve safety and comfort of Europeans but only if test solutions 
exist that match the silicon cost-down.  
The objective of this PostDoc is  to achieve this cost-down by developing and deploying innovative, cost-effective test 
solutions for integrated circuits that meet the constantly increasing quality requirements. The cost-effective part should 
surpass the cost down on the manufacturing side of these products as ensured by Moore’s law, while the improved quality 
levels should surpass those set by industry.
Hardware implementation of dedicated functions and co-processors allows performance improvement compared to 
software solutions; however, a hardware fault may jeopardize the reliability of the device. In addition, digital circuits  become 
more and more sensitive to aging phenomenon, SEUs and SETs due to dimension shrinking in new technologies.
The particular goal of the post-doctoral work performed by Rodrigo was  threefold: Investigation of test procedures for 
hardware implementation of co-processing functions; Development of dedicated concurrent fault detection techniques  for 
specific co-processors; Development of new solutions for resistance against transient and permanent faults
Hakim Zimouche - Pre Bond Test of TSVs
The work of Hakim was complementary to the one of Yassine Fkih. He also addressed the pre-bond test of TSVs, with a 
particular focus on a Built-In Self-Test method to measure the delay of the RC network (including the TSV)  that does not rely 
on ring oscillator.
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He designed a Built-In Self-Test architecture that allows  measuring the dischargee time of the RC network where the 
expected delay was obtained by a full-custom implementation of a delay network composed of NAND gates.
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5. Teaching activities
Starting from my Ph.D. studies, I have performed various  teaching activities at different levels: engineering students of the 
Politecnico di Torino and the Engineering School of the University of Montpellier 2, master students of the military school of 
the University of Torino, students of private institutions, as well as embedded tutorials on specific scientific topics in 
international conferences. 
The topics of my teaching activities (focusing on academic courses only), as well as the description of the course and the 
targeted students are described in the following paragraphs:
• Computer Sciences: this class introduces the student to the issues  related to computer science and it aims at teaching 
the use of computer programming using the C language. 
‣ Covered topics: Data types, Symbolic constants, Input/output operations (printf and scanf), Control-Flow structures 
(iterative and conditional), Arrays and multidimensional arrays (of integers,  reals and characters), Functions and calls 
(by reference, by value, pointers), Strings, Command line arguments  (argc and argv), Files, Struct,  Dynamic memory 
allocation.
‣ When, where, for who: 
- 2000/01, 2001/02, 2005/06, Politecnico di Torino, Computer Engineering students
- 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11, 2011/12, Polytech’ Montpellier (Université de Montpellier II), Electronic Engineering 
students
• Advanced Computer Sciences: this class introduces classical algorithms, data structures and problem-solving 
paradigms in C. 
‣ Covered topics: Complexity analysis, Elementary data structures: stacks, queues, lists, Abstract data types, Problem-
solving paradigms: divide and conquer, dynamic programming, Recursion, Sorting algorithms, Graphs theory.
‣ When, where, for who: 
- 2001/02, 2002/03, 2003/04, 2004/05, Politecnico di Torino, Computer Engineering students 
• Computer Architecture: this class introduces the basic information about the architecture of a computer system. 
‣ Covered topics: CPU architecture, Assembly level programming languages, arithmetic units, memories  and memory 
management systems, peripheral devices and their management (serial and parallel port interfaces, timers, interrupt 
and DMA controllers), communication structures. 
‣ When, where, for who: 
- 2005/06, Politecnico di Torino, Computer Engineering students
- 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11, 2011/12, 2012/13, 2013/14, Polytech’ Montpellier (Université de Montpellier II), 
Electronic Engineering students
• Databases:  this class provides the knowledge of databases  in terms of conceptual design and management rules, with 
the focus on relational model. 
‣ Covered topics: Relational model - Relational algebra, SQL: data definition language and data management 
language, Transactional systems and failure management, Conceptual data model - Entity/Relationship model, 
Techniques for designing a conceptual schema, Techniques and tools  for designing a logical-relational schema, 
Normalization theory
‣ When, where, for who: 
- 2000/01, 2001/02, 2004/05, 2005/06, Politecnico di Torino, Computer Engineering students
- 2012/13, 2013/14, Polytech’ Montpellier (Université de Montpellier II), Electronic Engineering students
• Operating Systems: this course introduces the concurrent programming techniques and the architecture of operating 
systems, with particular emphasis on system resources and system programming. The Linux operating system is  used as 
a case study for analysis.
Chapter II: Details
Habilitation à Diriger les Recherches - Giorgio Di Natale
 62
‣ Covered topics: Architecture of operating systems,  Different forms of kernels, Sequential and concurrent processes, 
Process status, domain and context-switching, UNIX system call for process handling, Process synchronization, 
Event flags, signals, semaphores, IPC, System management: commands and shell scripts and filters
‣ When, where, for who: 
- 2000/01, 2001/02, 2002/03, 2006/07, Politecnico di Torino, Computer Engineering students
- 2007/08, 2012/13,  2013/14, Université de Montpellier II, Electronic Master students (focus on “Commands and 
shell scripts and filters” only) and Polytech Montpellier
• Automatic Processes: this  course provides  basics on automatic control  systems, including analysis and design of 
feedback control loops.
‣ Covered topics: Introduction to control systems: open- and closed-loop control systems, uncertainties  and 
disturbance signals in feedback control systems, Frequency response analysis: Bode, polar and Nyquist plots, 
Stability of linear feedback systems: Nyquist criterion and stability margins. 
‣ When, where, for who: 
- 2004/05, 2005/06, Università di Torino, Strategic Science master students
• Digital System Testing: The course aims at showing the importance of testing within the design and manufacturing 
process. It presents the techniques for testing custom Integrated Circuits, microprocessors, memories, and system test. 
‣ Covered topics:  Fault modeling, understanding of the tools for testing an embedded system: fault simulator, 
automatic test pattern generator, tools for automatic scan chain insertion. Concept of Built-In Self-Test (BIST).
‣ When, where, for who: 
- 2006/07, Politecnico di Torino, Computer Engineering students
- 2008/09, EMSE Gardanne, Master SISA Students
- 2012/13, Polytech Montpellier
• Tutorial  on “Test and Security”:  Cryptographic algorithms are used to protect sensitive information from untrusted 
parties  when the communication medium is not secure. Many secure systems such as smartcards include hardware 
implementation of symmetric cryptographic algorithms such as (Triple)  Data Encryption Standard and Advanced 
Encryption Standard. The secret keys used to encrypt the data with these algorithms are large enough to prevent any 
brute force attack that consists in exploring the whole solution space (2n with 64<n<256). However,  the hardware 
implementation of these cryptographic algorithms allows the hackers to measure the observable characteristics of the 
physical  implementation and deduce the secret key (side‐channel attacks). The key can even be discovered by applying a 
side‐channel attack on scan chains. These scan chains,  which aim to provide full controllability and observability of internal 
states, represent nevertheless the most popular design‐ for‐testability scheme. Because crypto‐processors and others 
cores in a secure system must pass through high‐quality test procedures  to ensure that data are correctly processed, 
testing of crypto chips faces a dilemma: how to develop a design‐for‐testability scheme that provides high testability (high 
controllability and observability)  while maintaining high security (minimal controllability and observability)?  This  tutorial 
presents the security weaknesses generated by scan designs on hardware AES and DES implementations. It also 
discusses the pros and cons of security‐dedicated DFT, BIST and Fault tolerance solutions taken from the literature.
‣ Covered topics: Test & security: antagonism, Scan‐based approach, BIST approach, Fault tolerance.
‣ When,  where, for who: this course has been presented as  embedded tutorial (90 minutes for an international 
audience of engineers and researchers) during the following international events:
- 2009, IEEE Latin America Workshop (LATW’09)
- 2009, IEEE European Test Symposium (ETS’09)
- 2010, IEEE International Symposium on Design and Diagnostics of Electronic Circuits and Systems (DDECS’10)
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6. Funded Projects
Starting from my Ph.D., I have actively cooperated to national- and european-funded scientific projects. In some cases  I 
have contributed in the redaction of the project proposal (GRAAL, TestDOC, TReDiCo, Liesse, CLERECO, TRUDEVICE). 
Some details concerning each project are presented in the next sub-sections, following a chronological order.
Giovani Ricercatori 
Title: Development of a software environment for highly dependable space applications
Place and period: 2000-2002, Politecnico di Torino
Funding: framework of the “Giovani Ricercatori” (Young Researchers) project within Politecnico di Torino (50K€)
Goal of the project: development of new methodologies to increase the dependability of space applications using software 
techniques. the software fault tolerance aims at addressing system failures caused by a hard or soft error appearing in the 
system hardware. The main results of this project have been, from one side, an ad-hoc Source-to-Source C++ compiler able 
to transforms any input C/C++ source code into an output C/C++ reliable code, properly modified to increase its 
dependability characteristics, and, from the other side, a proprietary Fault Injection tool running under Windows NT 4.0.
Contribution and results: my contribution in this project was the introduction of some methodologies  to increase the reliability 
of the system in a source-to-source compiler ([W6], [S8]) and the development of the fault injection tool ([W9]).
GRAAL 
Title: Generatore di celle RAM ad Altissima Affidabilità per applicazioni Life e safety-critical (Tool for Highly Dependable 
SRAMs Generation)
Place and period: 2001-2003, Politecnico di Torino
Participants: Aurelia Microelettronica (project leader), Politecnico di Torino, Università degli Studi di Pavia, ERMEC, ABEL s.r.l.
Funding: project S167P founded by the Italian Ministry of the University and Technological and Scientific Research (720M€)
Goal of the project:  using GRAAL, the designer can define a dependable SRAM architecture,  which achieves the target 
dependability requirements and design constraints.  The dependable SRAM architecture is designed in order to guarantee 
high reliability levels. It includes the Built-In-Self-Test (BIST) logic for memory testing: it allows testing the memory using OFF-
line and/or ON-line testing strategies. In the case of ON-line testing, the implementation of both Concurrent and Not-
Concurrent test strategies is supported. Moreover, the dependable SRAM architecture can also include the Built-In Self 
Repair (BISR) logic for functional memory repairing. 
Contribution and results:  my contribution in this project was the definition of the reliable SRAM architecture and, in particular, 
the design of proper BIST and BISR schemes. Results of the project have been published in [C5] and [S18].
Test DOC
Title: Test Doc, Quality and Reliability of Complex Systems-on-Chip
Place and period: 2001-2003, Politecnico di Torino
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Participants:  Politecnico di Torino (project leader), LIRMM, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, Siemens ICN, LogicVision, 
Virage Logic
Funding: Istituto Superiore M. Boella, www.testgroup.polito.it/tdoc (1200M€)
Goal of the project: the project aimed at defining new Design for Testability (DfT), Built -In Self-Test (BIST), and Built-In Self-
Repair (BISR) techniques to improve the quality and dependability of System-on-Chips (SoCs). The research addressed both 
the general problem of planning and implementing a global test strategy for SoCs, and the specific problem of defining 
effective DfT, BIST, and BISR architectures for different types of commonly used digital cores as FPGAs, Memories, and 
microprocessors.  Two industrial  demonstrators have been implemented to show the applicability and the effectiveness  of the 
techniques defined during the project.
Contribution and results: Leader of the Work Package 2 - Task 1 (“BISR  for SRAM memories”). Results of my contribution 
have been published in [J3] and [J4].
TReDiCo
Title: Testable and Reconfigurable Digital cores 
Place and period: 2004-2006, Politecnico di Torino
Participants: Politecnico di Torino, Institute of Informatics of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
Funding: Ministry of Education of the Slovak Republic and Ministry of the University and Technological and Scientific 
Research, under the “Slovak – Italian Science and Technology Co-operation for years 2004 – 2007” program
Goal of the project: the project was  aimed to research in the area of advanced testability and built-in self-test algorithms and 
methods with self-healing features and their application to digital cores. The goal is to design and implement efficient 
techniques for testability and reconfigurability applied into the digital cores.
Contribution and results: results of my contribution have been published in [C19], [C24] and [W25].
CALISSON
Title: Characterisation, Modelling and Security Specifications of integrated prototype circuits (“Characterization, Modeling, 
and Security Specifications of integrated prototype circuits”)
Place and period: 2007-2010, LIRMM
Participants: LIRMM, Atmel, CEA, Ecole des Mines in St Etienne, Gemalto, ParisTech, PSI Electronics, STMicroelectronics
Funding: FCE contract funded by the General Directorate for Competitiveness, Industry and Services (DGCIS)  and it is 
sponsored by the "Secure Communications Solutions" competitiveness cluster
Goal of the project:  the aim is to strengthen the security of electronic components by developing new means of secured 
characterization while designing integrated circuits, in order to reduce the overall cost related to security aspects.
Contribution and results: my contribution in this project has  been related to the definition of a methodology that allows 
designers of secure devices to reduce the time required to validate a counter measure against side-channel attacks  (in 
particular differential power analysis).  Results of the project have been published in [S40], [W54], [S59] and presented in 
[P47], [P49], [P57], [P62].
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TOETS
Title: Towards One European Test Solution (TOETS)
Place and period: 2008-2011, LIRMM
Participants:  NXP, Infineon, Philips,  Q-Star Test, Semicon, STMicroelectronics, Temento, iRoC, ATMEL, E2V Semiconductor, 
JTAG Technologies, Salland Engineering, Advan- ced Digital Design, Tomorrow Options Microelectronics,  Ophtimalia, CEA-
LETI, CEA-LIST, University of Twente, LIRMM, TIMA, KULEUVEN, SUPELEC, IMSE-CNM, INESC Porto
Funding: European Project CATRENE CT302 (more than 1M€ for the LIRMM)
Goal of the project: has the ambition to create a breakthrough in methods and flows used by the test technologies by 
considering the test in the whole value chain from Design to Application. It faces the giga-scale complexity of SoC with 
various and numerous implemented functions (RF, analogue, digital, memory), for which test becomes an economical 
roadblock.  Its objectives are the definition of test architectures for minimizing the costs of test operation, to develop 
alternative test solutions and test flows for test cost reduction and product quality improvement. TOETS is geared toward the 
secure and safety critical  application domain (consumer and medical). 
Contribution and results:  my contribution in this  project deals with on-site testing of digital secure devices (WorkPackage 
1.1).  I cooperated in the definition of a Built-In Self-Test method that allows high fault coverage while guaranteeing the non 
violability of the secret stored in the secure device. Results have been published in [J8], [J9], [W34], [S42], [C52] and 
presented in [P36], [P37], [P45].
ProSecure
Title: Pro Secure
Place and period: 2010-2013, LIRMM
Participants: Cortus, INVIA, LIRMM, IM2NP
Funding: Languedoc-Roussillon region and Oseo (more than 1.4M€)
Goal of the project:  to develop a new 32-bit embedded secure RISC processor which integrates all protections needed to 
make the system resistant to all kinds of attacks (e.g., faults, timing, reverse engineering,  side channel). The microprocessor 
will respect tight constraints in terms of area and power consumption in such a way it will be possible to use it in applications 
like smart cards.
Contribution and results:  the contribution of the LIRMM will focus the definition of test strategies that allow detecting the 
highest number of faults while respecting the constraints related to the security (Work Packages  2 and 6). Results  of the 
project have been published in [J18], [J16], [J15], [J13], [J12].
CALISSON 2
Title: Characterisation, Modelling and Security Specifications  of integrated prototype circuits 2 (“Characterization, Modeling, 
and Security Specifications of integrated prototype circuits”)
Place and period: 2011-2014, LIRMM
Participants:  Gemalto, Inside, CEA LETI, LIRMM, Ecole des Mines  in St Etienne, Oridao, PSI Electronics, STMicroelectronics, 
Telecom ParisTech
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Funding: FCE contract funded by the General Directorate for Competitiveness, Industry and Services (DGCIS)  and it is 
sponsored by the "Secure Communications Solutions" competitiveness cluster (1.8M€)
Goal of the project: the project aims to improve the security of integrated circuits for the IC market providing security 
functions like Smart Card, Digital  Passport, or One Time Password. The ambition of CALISSON 2 is  twofold. From one side 
it targets the improvement of the attack models developed during the CALISSON project by analyzing aggressive 
technologies beyond 65nm; from the other side, the project will develop a methodology to automatically insert in the design 
flow all the techniques and architectures  proposed in CALISSON in order to reduce the cost related to the design of secure 
integrated circuits.
Contribution:  Development of a simulation)-based fault injector tool and design of a countermeasure based on integrated 
sensor in the bulk of the circuit (BBICS: Bulk  Built-In Current Sensor). Results of the project have been published in [J17], 
[J14], [J11], [P35], [W18].
LIESSE
Title: Laser-Induced fault Effects in Security-dedicated circuitS
Place and period: 2012-2016, LIRMM
Participants: LIRMM (project leader), ST, Ecole des Mines in St Etienne, LCIS, TIMA, ONERA
Funding: ANR, program “Ingénierie Numérique & Sécurité” (600 K€)
Goal of the project:  the project focuses on countermeasures  against fault attacks. Several papers have been published on 
such attacks, but mainly from a theoretical perspective i.e. by assuming some characteristics of the errors due to the 
injected faults. For instance, if it is supposed that one is able to change the value of a given bit at a given moment, then it is 
shown that it  is possible to derive the secret key used during an encryption. Conversely, relatively few studies have shown 
the actual possibility to inject such appropriate faults  in a circuit (i.e. with the expected characteristics) and especially onto 
deep-submicron technology circuits (65 nm, 40nm and 22 nm technologies). The main goals of this  project are to study and 
model the effect of laser shots onto submicronic circuits and to provide efficient tools to circuit designers to prevent such 
laser attacks.
Contribution:  fault modeling of laser effects  (on both front- and back-side of the circuit), enhancement of the fault simulator 
developed in the CALISSON 2 project to consider geometrical and physical parameters. Preliminary results  of the project 
have been published in [C13].
HOMERE
Title: Hardware trOjans: Menaces et RoubustEsse de ciRcuits intEgrés
Place and period: 2012-2015, LIRMM
Participants:  Cassidian Cybersecurity (project leader), Secure-IC, Gemalto, ANSSI,  ARMINES, CEA-LETI, LIRMM, Telecom 
ParisTech
Funding: FUI13 - OSEO - SYSTEMATIC PARIS-REGION (value of the project: 5M€, funding: 2M€)
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Goal of the project: this  project targets industrial research problems and it deals with the development of new methods to 
counteract possible Hardware Trojans. An important constraint that will be respected in the project is  the definition of non-
invasive methods that do not destroy the circuit to detect the presence of Trojans (like reverse-engineering).
Contribution:  this project belongs to a trans-domain context for our group.  The detection of possible Hardware Trojans will 
be addressed through techniques and methods that are generally used for the manufacturing testing of the integrated 
circuits. This topic will be more detailed in Chapter 3 (Perspectives).
MASTER 3D
Title: MAnufacturing Solutions Targeting competitive European pRoduction in 3D (MASTER 3D)
Place and period: 2012-2015, LIRMM
Participants:  Air Liquide Electronics Systems, Austriamicrosystems, AXO DRESDEN GmbH, CAMTEK, CAMTEK LTD, 
Doublecheck Semiconductors GmbH, DR Yield, EV Group, Fogale Nanotech, GLOBALFOUNDRIES, ISIS sentronics GmbH, 
MASER Engineering, Mentor Graphics MAD/Micred, Nanda Technologies GmbH, NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, 
Presto Engineering Europe, PVA TePla,  QUALTERA SAS, Rockwood Wafer Reclaim SAS, SILTRONIC AG,  SOITEC, SPTS, 
STMicroelectronics Crolles SAS (project leader),  ST-Ericsson, Budapest Univ. of Technology & Economics,  CEA, Fraunhofer 
Gesellschaft, IMS Bordeaux, LIRMM. 
Funding: CATRENE European Project
Goal of the project: The MASTER_3D project will  contribute to transforming EU leadership in R&D of 3D Integrated Circuits 
into 3D IC manufacturing leadership.  Manufacturing methods to maximize process robustness and yield, minimize ramp-up 
time, support high volume production and reduce manufacturing cost will be developed and implemented in the consortium 
FABs. The activities will  focus on 3D ICs with Through Silicon Vias (TSV) and Wafer Level Packaging (WLP).  Manufacturing 
Excellence will be addressed by: tool enhancements to support high yield, mass  production; novel 3D Wafer Parametric 
Test, Functional and Final Test concepts; Characterization and in-line Metrology methods development.
Contribution:  3D Test Pattern Generation,  Pre-bond testing of TSVs. Results of the project have been published in [C14], 
[S30], [P33], [P34], [W16], [C12].
COST Action TRUDEVICE
Title: Trustworthy Manufacturing and Utilization of Secure Devices (TRUDEVICE)
Websites: 
• www.trudevice.com
• http://www.cost.eu/domains_actions/ict/Actions/IC1204
Place and period: 2012-2016, LIRMM
Particularity: this project is  a network of excellence that groups 22 countries in Europe and more than 60 entities 
(universities, research centers, industrial companies). The overall value of the project is 88M€. For this project, I am the 
action chair (i.e.,  project leader). Within the contest of TRUDEVICE, we organized 1 workshop,  1 working group meeting, 
and we will organize 2 workshops in 2014, a summer school and a workshop in 2015.
Funding: Europe COST (600K€)
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Goal of the project: Hardware security is becoming increasingly important for many embedded systems applications ranging 
from small RFID tag to satellites orbiting the earth. Its relevance is  expected to increase in the upcoming decades as  secure 
applications such as public services, communication, control and healthcare will keep growing. The vulnerability of hardware 
devices that implement cryptography functions (including smart cards) has become the Achille’s heel in the last decade. 
Therefore,  the industry is recognizing the significance of hardware security to combat semiconductor device counterfeiting, 
theft of service and tampering. This COST action aims at creating a European network of competence and experts  on all 
aspects of hardware security including design, manufacturing,  testing, reliability, validation and utilization. The network will 
play a key role in developing solutions responding to the hardware security challenges,  hence strengthening the position of 
Europe in the field.
CLERECO
Title: Cross-Layer Early Reliability Evaluation for the Computing cOntinuum (CLERECO)
Website: www.clereco.eu 
Place and period: 2013-2016, LIRMM
Grant agreement no: 611404
Participants: Politecnico di Torino, LIRMM, University of Athens, Thales, Intel, ABB, Yogitech
Particularity: for this project I am the scientific leader for LIRMM.
Funding: FP7 Strep Project (value of the project: 4M€, funded: 2.5M€)
Goal of the project: CLERECO research project recognizes early accurate reliability evaluation as one of the most important 
and challenging tasks throughout the design cycle of computing systems across all domains. In order to continue harvesting 
the performance and functionality offerings of technology scaling, we need to dramatically improve current methodologies to 
evaluate the reliability of the system. On one hand, we need accurate methodologies  that reduce the performance and 
energy tax paid to guarantee correct operation of systems. The rising energy costs needed to compensate for increasing 
unpredictability are rapidly becoming unacceptable in today’s environment where energy consumption is often the limiting 
factor on integrated circuit performance. On the other hand, early “budgeting” for reliability has the potential to save 
significant design effort and resources and has a profound impact on the TTM of a product. CLERECO addresses  early 
reliability evaluation with a cross-layer approach across different computing disciplines,  across computing system layers and 
across computing market segments to address reliability for the emerging computing continuum. CLERECO methodology 
will consider low-level information such as raw failure rates as well as the entire set of hardware and software components of 
the system that eventually determine the reliability delivered to the end users. The CLERECO project methodology for early 
reliability evaluation will be comprehensively assessed and validated in advanced designs from different applications provided 
by the industrial partners for the full stack of hardware and software layers.
Contribution: the project just started. A PhD student is currently performing a comprehensive analysis of the literature.
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7. Cooperations
7.1. Universities
Paolo Prinetto, Alfredo Benso, Silvia Chiusano, Stefano Di Carlo (Politecnico di  Torino): Paolo, Alfredo and Silvia have been 
my PhD supervisor. Stefano (who made the PhD studies at the same time as me)  shared many research topics with me, 
leading to several publications. The cooperation lasted also after moving to LIRMM, by keeping on developing techniques  for 
the evaluation and the improvement of the reliability of a system.
Matteo Sonza Reorda (Politecnico di Torino): we shared for 4 years (from 2009  to 2013) the coordination of the European 
section of the Test Technology Technical Council. Matteo was the chair of the eTTTC while I was the vice-chair.
Guy Gogniat (Université de Bretagne-Sud): we shared for 4 years (from 2009  to 2013)  the coordination of the working group 
“Security of Digital Embedded Systems” of the GDR  SoC-SiP. Guy was the chair of the working group while I was the vice 
co-chair.
Paolo Maistri  (TIMA Lab): we presented together a tutorial titled “Test & Security” during the European Test Symposium 
2009.
Sybille Hellebrand (Univeristy of Paderborn): we cooperated to join our knowledge of test and repair of memories. The result 
of the cooperation has been two common papers ([S16] and [P11]).
Elena Gramatova (Institute of Informatics of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, from 2004 to 2006): in the context of the 
TReDiCo project, we developed a method for the built-in generation of test vectors for delay faults ([P2]). 
M. Hosseinabady, Z.  Navabi (University of Tehran, Iran from 2006  to 2007): we developed a new approach for the soft error 
evaluation based on the use of the UML for the model of the target system ([S9] and [S13]).
Ilia Polian (University of Passau, from 2012): Ilia is  the vice chair of the COST Action TRUDEVICE and we often cooperate in 
order to lead the Action. Moreover, always in the context of TRUDEVICE, one of my PhD student (Feng Lu) spent 3  weeks at 
the University of Passau to improve the quality of his fault simulator. 
Said Hamdioui (TU Delft, from 2012): Said is actively involved in the TRUDEVICE COST Action. Moreover, we are planning a 
common proposal for an Horizon 2020 project on security.
Ingrid Verbauwhede (Catholic University of Leuven, from 2012): we started a cooperation in the field of the test and security, 
and in particular in the definition of a protocol-based test access mechanism that allows protecting secure circuits from scan 
attacks. We published several common papers ([J18], [J15], [J12], [S27], [W15]).
Jean Max Dutertre (ENMSE, from 2008): we started a shared research activity with the CALISSON project,  followed by 
CALISSON 2 and LIESSE. We have currently designed a CMOS circuit implementing the BBICS (Bulk Built-In Current 
Sensor).  Moreover, we co-supervise the PhD student Stephan De Castro. We published some common papers ([J17], [P35], 
[W18], [S28]).
7.2. Companies
Pascal Vivet (CEA, from 2011): this collaboration started with the MASTER  3D project and the co-supervision of the PhD 
student Yassine Fkih. We published some common papers ([P34], [W16],[C12]) and we realized a patent.
Schloeffel Juergen (Mentor Graphics, from 2013): together with Pascal Vivet we defined a novel test access method based 
on IJTAG for 3D circuits. We recently made a common presentation [P34] and submitted a paper.
Riccardo Mariani  (Yogitech, from 2001): this  cooperation lasts from many years. I worked with him on memory testing in the 
framework of the GRAAL project. After that,  we designed together a watchdog process to increase the reliability of 
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automotive applications. We are currently working together in the context of the CLERECO project. We published some 
common papers ([S17] and [P1]).
Denis Real (DGA, 2008): we cooperated in the framework of the development of a DPA tool analysis [W14].
Monica Lobetti Bodoni (Siemens,  from 2001 to 2003):  the cooperation with Siemens was mainly oriented to the definition of 
a BIST and BISR scheme for memories. We published some common papers ([J4], [J1],[C1], [W2], [W1]).
Chapter II: Details
Habilitation à Diriger les Recherches - Giorgio Di Natale
 71
8. Dissemination of knowledge and scientific excellence
8.1. Executive and organizing committees
TRUDEVICE Workshops: I organized as General Chair the first workshop for the COST Action TRUDEVICE on May 30-31, 
2013  in Avignon (France)  and the second on May 29-30, 2014 in Paderborn (Germany). Both workshops are held in 
conjunction with the European Test Symposium
European Test Symposium (ETS): I have been Publication Chair from 2012 and I will cover the role of Vice-Program Chair for 
ETS’15 in Cluj-Napoca (Romania)
Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference (DATE):  I cover the role of Review Chair from 2012. This role is very close 
to the Program Chair for the handling of the submissions, the review process, and the creation of the technical program.
Design and Test of Integrated Circuits (DTIS): I will be Vice-Program Chair for the 2014 edition in Santorini (Greece) and 
Program Chair in 2015 in Napoli (Italy)
VLSI Test Symposium (VTS): I have been the Publicity and Web Chair from 2006 to 2013 and  Publication Chair from 2012.
Latin American Test Workshop (LATW): I cover the role of Publicity Chair from 2011.
South European Test Seminar (SETS): General Chair in 2007 and co General Chair in 2014.
8.2. Program committee and reviewer
Associate Editor of the journal: “Information Security Journal: A Global Perspective”
Guest Editor of the journal “IEEE Design & Test” for the special issue on “ETS Papers”
Guest Editor of the journal “IEEE JETTA: Journal of Electronic Testing - Theory and Applications” for the special issue on 
“ETS Papers”
Program Committee member: 
• Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference (DATE): from 2008 to 2011
• Latin American Test Workshop (LATW): from 2012
• VLSI Test Symposium (VTS): from 2007
• International Online Testing Symposium (IOLTS): from 2010
• European Test Symposium (ETS): from 2007
• Euromicro Conference on Digital System Design (DSD): from 2009
• Conference on Design of Circuits and Integrated Systems (DCIS): from 2006
• IEEE International Conference on Embedded and Ubiquitous Computing (EUC): from 2014
• Conference on Automation, Quality, Test and Robotics (AQTR): from 2004
Reviewer for the following Journals: 
• IEEE Transaction on Computer
• IEEE Transaction on VLSI
• IEEE Design and Test of Computers 
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• IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing
• IEEE Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems
• Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
• IEEE Journal of ELectronic Testing - Theory and Applications
• IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems
• Elsevier Microprocessors and Microsystems
• IET Computers & Digital Techniques
• International Journal of Communications, Network and System Sciences
Reviewer for the following conferences: DAC (2013), ITC (from 2008)
8.3. TTTC
The Test Technology Technical Council  (TTTC)  is a volunteer professional organization sponsored by the IEEE Computer 
Society. TTTC's goals  are to contribute to our members' professional development and advancement, to help them solve 
engineering problems in electronic test,  and to help advance the state-of-the art. In particular, TTTC aims at facilitating the 
knowledge flow in an integrated manner, to ensure overall quality in terms of technical excellence, fairness, openness, and 
equal opportunities. Since 2004 I have been strongly involved in the organization of some activities of the TTTC. In particular:
• Web Master of the "Test Technology Technical Council" (tab.computer.org/tttc) of IEEE Computer Society (from 2004) 
• Vice-Chair of the Technical Activity on "HARDWARE SECURITY AND TRUST" of IEEE Computer Society TTTC (from 2011)
• TTTC Test Technology Educational Program (TTEP): Publicity Chair (from 2012)
• Chair of the Database Group of the "Test Technology Technical Council" (TTTC) of IEEE Computer Society (from 2012) 
• Vice-Chair of the European "Test Technology Technical Council" (www.etttc.org) of IEEE Computer Society (2010-2013)
• Chair of the European "Test Technology Technical Council" (www.etttc.org) of IEEE Computer Society (from 2014)
8.4. GDR
Security of embedded systems is a hot topic at both French and international levels. In France, several research groups and 
industrial companies are extremely involved in this topic,  covering multiple domains like the definition of new cryptographic 
algorithms, the hardware/software co-design of secure components, the study of attacks and countermeasures.
In order to allow all actors to meet and to enable knowledge exchanges in the domain of the digital hardware security,  we 
have proposed in 2009 to create a working group in the context of the GDR SoC-SiP (Groupe de Recherche) owned by the 
CNRS. From 2009 to 2013 I covered the role of Co-Chair of the Technical Activity on "Embedded System Security”.
In this framework, we organized 7 one-day workshops on different topics:
• Hardware Security introduction: threats and countermeasures
• Side Channel Attacks
• Security of reconfigurable components
• Electro-magnetic attacks
• Cryptography and Arithmetic
• Security of Embedded Operating Systems 
• PUFs and Trojans 	
Chapter II: Details
Habilitation à Diriger les Recherches - Giorgio Di Natale
 73
8.5. Awards
Best paper (Transaction on Computer), awarded by a movie published at “Computing Now” (http://www.computer.org/
portal/web/computingnow/1211/whatsnew/tc)
"IEEE Computer Society Golden Core Member" (2011)
"Meritorious Service Award - in recognition of more than 8 years of significant services for TTTC Electronic Media" (2007)
"Certificate of Appreciation from IEEE Computer Society for serving as TTTC Webmaster in 2006/2007" (2007)
"Certificate of Appreciation from IEEE Computer Society for serving as TTTC Webmaster in 2004/2005" (2005)
8.6. National expertises
• Review of a candidature for the ANR Young Researchers Programme (JCJC 2013)
• ANRT service CIFRE for Gemalto
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My cursus  has a clear background on all activities, disciplines and skills related to dependability, test, fault tolerance and 
reliability of digital systems. At the beginning of my research carrier, these skills  were applied to memories and then to 
complex processor-based systems for which a software is  running. After moving to LIRMM, I specialized in test,  fault 
tolerance and reliability for secure devices. Moreover, I kept on working on the reliability of computer-based systems. 
Recently, I started analyzing the domain of the 3D stacked Integrated Circuits based on the use of Through Silicon Vias.
My perspectives are organized following the 3 main themes of my research activities: Security, Test, Dependability.
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9. Perspectives on Security
Since the invention of the first integrated circuit (IC) in 1958  and introduction of first standalone Central Processing Unit 
(CPU) in 1971, we witnessed and continue to observe the breathtaking advances  in IC manufacturing, transistor density and 
architectural  solutions.  These advances fueled the imagination of developers so that we now have diverse application fields 
for integrated circuits; from RF ID chips and micro-controllers  to CPUs for desktop PCs with billion transistors integrated. ICs 
and systems have become a multibillion-dollar business and represent the physical backbone of our digitalized world. 
Interesting enough,  they are being increasingly deployed even in many security-critical infrastructures  such as sensitive 
governmental organizations, military, and financial/banking systems, where the impact and consequences of attacks could 
be catastrophic.  Till  recently,  we have intuitively trusted the chips to control our lives and processes, so we have huge 
amount of sensitive information processed in chips. However, nowadays, attacks are being launched increasingly for 
economic reasons  by well-funded criminal organizations or for intelligence purposes to get access to secret and sensitive 
information. Moreover, the emergence of globalized and horizontal IC and semiconductor business  model, mainly driven by 
cost savings, is requiring both designs and users re-asses  their trust in hardware and even in the supply chain. In recent 
years many reports have appointed to these attacks on the electronic components and their supply chain.  The 
semiconductor industry is today loosing over $4 billion a year due to these kind of attacks; not to mention the catastrophic 
results these attacks could have for critical applications.
Depending on their targets, hardware attacks can be classified into three classes:
• IC data (assets)  attacks: These are attacks  that aim at retrieving the secret data of the IC; e.g.,  hacking a smart cart to get 
the secret key;
• IC design (IP) attacks: These are attacks that aim at getting more information on the IC design in order to counterfeit it; 
e.g., perform reverse engineering on an IC or IP, steal and/or even claim the ownership;
• IC functionality (tampering)  attacks: these are attacks  that target the alternation of the original function of the chip/system. 
For example, a chip ceases functioning or continues to operate but then in an impaired manner, a chip introducing 
corruption in the data, etc.
9.1. Asset Attacks
These types of attacks  are performed in order to retrieve a secret information stored in the circuit (for instance the secret key 
of a circuit implementing a cryptographic algorithm). For scan-chain-based and fault attacks, the countermeasures are often 
based on testing and fault tolerance techniques. Based on my background, I will keep on investigating new threats and 
solutions for these 2 types of attacks.
9.1.1. Scan-Chain-based Attacks
Although we have proposed efficient results to counteract attacks based on the use of the scan chains, there is still room for 
the investigation of solutions and architecture that will allow on-site debugging facilities for the end user.
This  scenario is extremely critical because, from the circuit point of view, there are no differences between an attacker or a 
valid user who wants to gather internal information stored within the circuit.
To address this point, I recently submitted a CHIST-ERA project to obtain enough man power to successfully solve this issue.
The main idea that it will be investigated is the re-use of the secret information within the circuit (for instance the secret 
encryption key) to encrypt the scan chain content. This method will deliver the content of the scan chain (i.e., the internal 
state of the circuit)  without compromising the overall security for those users who do not know the value of the secret key. 
The valid user will be therefore able to decrypt the receive information, while an attacker will not be able to exploit these data.
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9.1.2. Fault Attacks
The strength of the circuit against an attack is much more difficult to assess at design time w.r.t. other properties. Any 
vulnerabilities not detected during design phase causes the designer not only a significant economical defeat related to 
design time spent for useless countermeasures, but also a substantial decrease in incomes because of the non-secure 
product. 
It is therefore essential for designers of secure devices to have a CAD environment to validate the effectiveness  of their 
countermeasures at an early stage of the design. However,  such a design environment does not currently exist in 
semiconductor manufacturer industry as well  as in academic laboratories, especially for tomorrow’s deep-submicron 
technologies. There are two main reasons why the task of early evaluation of a countermeasure remains still a concern.  From 
one side, it is very difficult to understand and to model physical phenomena underlying a fault attack, especially for new 
technologies. On the other hand, there are no available CAD tools that incorporate such models to simulate the effect of an 
injection. In the project we will focus on laser injections because this  type of attack has been proved to be extremely 
effective.
In the future year, thanks to the cooperations with the ONERA and the Ecole de Mines  (Gardanne), in the conext of the 
LIESSE project we will try to measure and characterize the real effect of laser shots onto deep submicron circuits.
Starting from these physical observations, we will try to create electrical- and gate-level models of the laser shots onto the 
circuit, in order to deliver CAD tools  for simulation and/or emulation of laser induced effects. This type of tool will allow 
efficiently validating possible countermeasures that will be proposed in the future.
The reason of this  research direction resides on several aspects. First, no electrical models of laser shots onto the circuit 
exist yet. It is  possible to find several models for older technologies,  while the effect of laser injections on 65nm (and beyond) 
circuit technology still remain an open issue.  Second, the integration of the strength analysis for a countermeasure in CAD 
tools is not mature yet.  The common industry practice is to validate the efficiency of a countermeasure after the production 
of the device, by physically attacking the circuit. Possibly, for applications that require a high level of security, the circuit can 
be instrumented with light sensors raising an alert whenever a laser attack is performed. However this type of solution is 
extremely expensive. The solution we will propose will allow the designer to implement cheaper countermeasures without 
compromising the overall circuit security. 
9.2. IP Attacks
Fabless semiconductor industries are facing new threats,  i.e., the possibility for the manufacturer to re-use the masks  for 
producing additional copies (clones). The cloned ICs are built in the same or similar factories as the original and legal ones, 
and then sold within illegal markets. IC cloning must be prevented for several reasons: 1. the risk for future customers to rely 
on non-reliable products since clones are not fully characterized and tested by the company that designed the IC, 2. the 
economic loss that follow on from the first risk, since non-reliable products stamped with the fabless  company name have a 
disastrous effect on the public image of the company, 3. the obvious additional economic losses for the fabless company 
that does not profit from the illegal market. 
We recently studied a possible solution to prevent integrated circuits from being cloned, by covering the whole production 
chain (from the design of reliable embedded anti-cloning structures  to the secured activation of the legal ICs using dedicated 
production tests). An important aspect of the proposed approach is the emphasis given to cost issues, which is  a true 
novelty. Indeed, industrials are facing with two choices  so far: either a very sophisticated and efficient protection, which are 
thus relatively expensive and consequently applied in very specific markets  like identification, or no protection at all.  We 
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intend to bridge the gap and propose an affordable solution that will  raise the cost of counterfeiting to the minimum level that 
makes it pointless. 
The main objective is to propose and validate an overall scheme to protect standard CMOS integrated circuits from being 
copied by optical cloning using one of these means: mask theft or basic reverse engineering. This  scheme must be easy to 
implement, transparent from the customer point of view and with negligible impact on the die cost.  This will imply the 
development of digital IPs along with a process of authentication to be run during industrialization. For that latter, emphasis is 
put on the seamless integration of the activation phase during the latest steps of industrialization. 
9.3. Tampering Attacks
The cost of new fabrication facilities  is becoming more and more prohibitive and outsourcing the fabrication process to low-
cost locations has  become a major trend in Integrated Circuit (IC) industry in the last decade. Untrusted foundries may 
therefore manipulate the circuits  with the possible insertion of Hardware Trojan Horses (HTs) are malicious alterations of 
integrated circuits  (ICs)  introduced at design or fabrication steps in order to modify the circuit’s intended behavior when 
deployed in the field. The goal of such alterations can be to introduce a hidden functionality, reduce the IC’s reliability, let leak 
sensitive information or cause a denial of service. HTs can be designed to be always on,  i.e.  able to affect the infected circuit 
at any time, or they may require an internal or external trigger to become active. 
Due to the diversity of possible implementations, activation and effects on the IC’s functionality, the detection of HTs is  a very 
challenging task. Recently, numerous  detection approaches have been published for post-silicon trust validation. Most of 
them assume that the design, layout and testing steps are trusted, while the fabrication facility is the only untrusted step of 
the design flow. HT detection approaches can be destructive or not; for the latter ones, detection mechanisms can be 
applied at test time or run-time. Non-destructive methods are divided into two categories: side-channel analysis and logic 
testing. I will focus on techniques based on logic testing,  in which the principle is to stimulate the input ports of an IC and 
monitor its outputs. If an erroneous behavior of the IC is observed, it can be inferred that a HT has  been inserted in the IC. 
However,  traditional ATPG testing may not be sufficient to detect HTs which are indeed stealthy in nature i.e. mostly inactive 
unless they are triggered by a “rare value”. The main goal is therefore to be able to activate potential HTs. We started 
investigating a procedure to identify circuit sites where a possible HT may easily be inserted. The selection of the sites is 
based on the following assumptions:
• a potential HT is triggered by nodes with a rare value (i.e. that are very rarely ‘0’ or very rarely ‘1)
• the trigger is inserted in paths that are not critical in terms of delay
• the trigger will be composed of multiple gates that are close one to the other in the circuit’s  layout, and close to available 
space. 
This activity is in the preliminary phase and it will be developed in-depth. 
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10. Perspectives on Test
3-Dimensional (3D)  integration is an emerging technology where multiple layers of planar 2D devices (tiers) are stacked and 
interconnected using so called Through Silicon Vias (TSVs). Besides footprint advantages, the potential benefits of 3D 
integration can include higher device speed, smaller overall cost, lower power consumption, larger bandwidth, and it will 
allows heterogeneous designs.  Unfortunately, die stacking also presents new challenges. Among them, test and testability 
must be redefined for 3D.
In particular, the test strategy must be specifically defined to cope with this fabrication process. When test steps are 
expected at different level of the stacking process  (pre-bond, mid-bond, and post-bond testing),  they should be enabled by 
the same test infrastructure for cost reduction.  Moreover, introduction of TSVs  for inter-die interconnection requires specific 
test steps for these elements. Test wrappers must also be defined for isolation and test access to the different dies.
In 2011, we started a new research axis, in collaboration with CEA Leti,  continuing within the framework of the european 
project MASTER3D for the definition of a complete 3D Design for Testability approach. Assuming that the 3D circuit can be 
accessed only from the bottom (bottom layer),  additional TSVs are needed to drive test data from the bottom die to upper 
dies, and boundary scan cells are used to form a die level wrapper either based on IEEE 1500 or IEEE 1149.1 standards.
We are currently studying the existing test standards (IEEE 1149.1, IEEE 1500, IEEE 1149.7,  and P1687)  showing 
advantages  and drawbacks of each one for 3D circuits.  We want to propose custom and dedicated extensions for coping 
with pre-bond testing of TSVs, post-bond testing of TSVs and obtained stack.
We are currently developing such infrastructures with related test-scheduling strategies by using the P1687 IJTAG standard. 
This  architecture relies on the usage of automatic die detectors, and it allows pre-, mid- and post- bond testing. The reason 
why we selected the P1687 standard is that it easily allows the retargeting of test patterns.
Our future works  will deal with the test scheduling taking into account not only test bandwidth but also power and thermal 
issues which are specific to 3D circuits. The scheduling method will also consider the manufacturing step in which the circuit 
is being tested (partial or final stack).
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11. Perspectives on Dependability
Information technology is  at the core of our society and it relies  completely on the design of electronic information processing 
systems. Today’s  computing is a true continuum that ranges from smart-phones  to mission-critical datacenter machines, 
and from desktops to automobiles.  On aggregate, these computing devices represent a total addressable market 
approaching a billion processors a year, which is expected to explode to more than two billion per year before 2020.
The computing industry move towards  the “computing continuum” means  that the same key technologies and industrial 
players will  act across all computing segments:  airplanes,  automobile, buildings, health instruments, smart-phones, tablets, 
desktops, servers, data-centers, clouds, high-performance computing (HPC), etc. Therefore,  in the near future we will see 
embedded systems (ES)  with HPC performance and functionalities, HPC systems used in time- and safety-critical 
applications, cloud resources used with very different business models, etc.
For more than three decades, industry has evolved by roughly doubling the device density (and corresponding performance) 
every two years following Moore’s law. However, future device integration technology is expected to dramatically reduce the 
device quality, and therefore the operational reliability of circuits: as the transistors  and wires shrink,  they show both larger 
differences  in behavior although they are designed to be identical (device variability, manufacturing defects, aging), and 
higher susceptibility to transient and permanent faults (soft-errors, wear-out). The great challenge for future technologies is 
building “dependable” systems on top of unreliable components, which will degrade and even fail during normal lifetime of 
the chip.
Conventional design techniques expend significant amount of energy to tolerate the device unpredictability by adding safety 
margins  to a circuit’s operating voltage, clock frequency or charge stored per bit. However, the rising energy costs needed to 
compensate for increasing unpredictability are rapidly becoming unacceptable in today’s environment where power 
consumption is  often the limiting factor on integrated circuit performance, and energy efficiency is a top concern. 
Implementing the computing continuum in this era,  where low reliability threatens to end the benefits of feature size 
reduction, requires a holistic approach across different computing disciplines, across computing system layers and across 
computing market segments to have a unique reliability assessment methodology.
In the next years,  and thanks to the CLERECO project, I want to investigate the problem of having an early, fast, and 
accurate evaluation of computing systems reliability to support design decisions for hardware and software reliability 
enhancing mechanisms in the system. Such a framework will be a key enabler for the continuation of technology scaling 
benefits harnessing for several decades. Moreover, it will also enable the implementation of the computing continuum that 
societal services demand.
The benefits of an early and accurate methodology for the computing continuum to estimate the reliability are many. First,  a 
tool that yields early estimate allows designers  to reduce the time-to-market (TTM)  of all products, enabling the fast 
turnaround of proliferation of computing systems tailored to customers’ needs. Second, accurate reliability estimates allow 
developing the required cost- and energy- efficient reliability solutions at the hardware and software layers. Such solutions 
can be only developed if the expected reliability of the system can be quickly and accurately assessed: (a)  at different stages 
of the design flow (from design concept and early design stages through first silicon validation and eventually during 
operation in the field), (b)  considering the impact of all  hardware and software components,  and the different modes of 
operation (use cases) of the system. Finally,  the development of a reliable and dependable product that employs 
mechanisms to detect and handle possible faults can reduce the overall life cycle costs.
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